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THE PLEA-BARGAIN CRISIS FOR NONCITIZENS
IN MISDEMEANOR COURT
Jason A. Cade†

This Article considers three factors contributing to a plea-bargain crisis for
noncitizens charged with misdemeanors: 1) the expansion of deportation laws
to include very minor offenses with little opportunity for discretionary relief
from removal; 2) the integration of federal immigration enforcement
programs with the criminal justice system; and 3) the institutional norms in
non-federal lower criminal courts, where little attention is paid to evidence or
individual equities and where bail and other process costs generally outweigh
perceived incentives to fight charges. The Article contends that these factors
increase the likelihood that a noncitizen’s low-level conviction will not reliably
indicate guilt or will be the product of unchecked constitutional rights
violations. Unwarranted convictions, many of which trigger deportation and
other negative immigration consequences, undermine the integrity of both
criminal justice and deportation systems. The Article also argues that,
contrary to the Supreme Court’s assumption in Padilla v. Kentucky, lawful
permanent resident defendants are often unable to effectively negotiate for
immigration-safe dispositions in the low-level cases where the rift between the
underlying criminal conduct and the deportation outcome is largest. The
Article’s analysis suggests that reforms at both federal and state levels remain
critical to address the disproportional immigration consequences of minor
convictions and the plea-bargain crisis for noncitizens in misdemeanor court.
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Hofstra Law School (2012) and the Scholarship and Teacher Development Workshop at Albany
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INTRODUCTION
A public defender working misdemeanor arraignments in New
York City represents thirty to fifty new clients in a shift. For each case,
the defender briefly reviews the arrest report in the court file, ascertains
the prosecutor’s plea offer, and then meets with the defendant for about
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ten minutes to discuss the options before the case is called. 1 If the
defendant asserts he is innocent, or if his account of the arrest raises
constitutional issues, the defender may inform him that he can plead
not guilty, but that the case will be repeatedly continued over a period of
many months until the court can adjudicate a suppression motion or
hold a trial. 2 During that time, the defendant will be jailed unless he is
released on his own recognizance or can make bail. 3 Overwhelmingly,
misdemeanor defendants cannot make bail even where it is set at $1000
or less. 4 In the majority of misdemeanor cases, the defendant pleads
guilty at arraignment or soon after, the judge imposes a light, agreed
upon sentence, and the defender’s representation of the client
concludes. 5
Similar scenarios play out in lower criminal courts throughout the
United States, where, following a recent explosion in arrests for lowlevel offenses, prosecutors now file approximately ten million
misdemeanor prosecutions each year, dwarfing the number of felony
cases. 6 The system copes with this enormous volume by processing
defendants quickly, categorically, and sometimes en masse. 7 Efficiency is
a foundational value of misdemeanor courts—one that outstrips other
systemic norms like due process, adversarial adjudication, and

1 See THE SPANGENBERG GRP., STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR
CHIEF JUDGE KAYE’S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 143
(2006), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/indigentdefense-commission/Spangenberg
GroupReport.pdf. (“[L]arge percentages of misdemeanor, violation and infraction cases plead
out at arraignment, often times after a lawyer has met with his or her client for only a couple of
minutes.”); Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of
Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 293, 308 n.95 (2002) (“In 2000 in New York City,
Assigned Counsel Lawyers handled 177,965 new defendants in the Bronx and Manhattan,
124,177 of those cases were disposed of at the first appearance—most by a plea of guilty entered
after no more than a ten-minute consultation with their lawyers.”).
2 Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1157, 1172 (2004) (noting that defendants who fight the charges in misdemeanor cases
must return to court three to twelve times).
3 In 2008, New York City judges imposed bail as a condition of release in about twenty-five
percent of nonfelony cases not resolved at arraignments. See Mosi Secret, Low Bail, but Weeks
in Jail Before Misdemeanor Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, at A27.
4 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF
LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 1 (2010), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf.
5 See id. at 3 (reporting that 99.6% of misdemeanor convictions in New York City are
guilty pleas); THE SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 1; Bernhard, supra note 1; cf. Issa KohlerHausmann, Managerial Justice & Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 63, fig.9) (on file with author) (citing data that over fifty percent of NYC
misdemeanor dispositions in 2011 were either adjournments in contemplation of dismissal or
convictions to non-criminal offenses).
6 ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL
OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009), available at http://www.nacdl.org/
WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=20808.
7 See infra Part III.A.
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evidence. 8 Lower court defense attorneys are likely to be green, snowed
under, and unwilling or unable to challenge the misdemeanor
conviction machine. 9 Often defendants proceed without any counsel at
all. 10 Facing prohibitively high bond, delay, repeated court appearances,
and other process costs, most misdemeanor defendants submit to the
institutional pressures to plead guilty at the earliest opportunity that
allows them to return to their jobs and families. 11
The misdemeanor prosecution system is problematic for many
defendants, but especially so for those who are not United States
citizens. For many immigrants, a conviction for a minor offense, despite
resulting in minimal punitive consequences under state law, leads to
detention, deportation, and bars to reentry. Turnstile jumping, petty
shoplifting, and misdemeanor marijuana possession, among many other
low-level offenses, can trigger deportation, sometimes with almost no
possibility of discretionary relief. Thus, defense counsel (if provided at
all) must ascertain whether the plea offered by the prosecutor raises
deportation or other negative immigration consequences, and if so,
attempt to negotiate a better bargain. 12 But heavy misdemeanor dockets
make thorough investigation of the client’s circumstances difficult in
general, and impossible at arraignment. Even where the immigration
consequences for a particular defendant are clear, the structural norms
endemic to the prosecution of petty offenses often foreclose effective
negotiation of immigration-neutral dispositions, especially at the first
court appearance. 13
The current integration of immigration enforcement with criminal
justice systems exacerbates some of these problems and creates
additional complexities for noncitizens charged with minor crimes.
Because Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) now has the
ability to screen criminal facilities in almost every jurisdiction through
enforcement programs like Secure Communities and the Criminal Alien
Program, detained noncitizens are increasingly likely to be placed under
immigration “detainers” early in the criminal process. 14 Through these
enforcement programs, ICE often detects immigrants at booking who
may already be deportable for civil immigration violations or prior
criminal history. Noncitizens marked by immigration detainers are
more likely to remain in custody during the pendency of their criminal

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.B.2.
10 See infra Part III.A.
11 See infra Part III.
12 See infra Part II.
13 See infra Part III.B.
14 See infra Part I.B (discussing the integration of federal immigration enforcement with
state and local criminal justice systems).
8
9
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proceedings. 15 These presumptively deportable noncitizens will face
removal proceedings regardless of the outcome of their criminal cases,
and the prospect of discretionary relief from removal can be very
difficult to assess without the assistance of an immigration expert. As a
result, such defendants often believe it futile and not worth the cost to
contest minor criminal charges while detained, even if they are
innocent, have strong defenses, or have been arrested through racial
profiling or other constitutional rights violations. 16
The integration of immigration enforcement programs also
influences the plea-bargain incentives of noncitizens not yet subject to
immigration detainers who cannot make bail. 17 Because prosecutors
often make plea offers at the defendant’s first appearance in low-level
cases, noncitizens willing to take the deal may be able to exit the system
without ICE detection. The risk that deportation will ensue if a
conviction is fought or delayed puts tremendous pressure on potentially
removable noncitizens to take almost any plea offer that avoids contact
with ICE, regardless of the future immigration problems that may be
triggered by the conviction, the strength of the prosecutor’s case, or
even their own culpability. 18 Even lawfully present noncitizens face this
dilemma where the misdemeanor case might end with a deportable
conviction, at which point ICE will take custody and initiate removal
proceedings.
Only recently has much attention been focused on misdemeanor
prosecutions in this country, and even now there are but a few
commentators shedding light on a system that is at once pervasive and
far removed from the popular perception of how criminal convictions
are obtained. 19 The particular crisis facing noncitizens arrested for petty
offenses, however, remains unexplored. 20
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.C.2.
17 Already prohibitively high for most misdemeanants, bail in many jurisdictions may be
increased if the court or prosecutor is aware the defendant is a noncitizen. See Gabriel J. Chin,
Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration Status and the Criminal
Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1423 (2011). See generally Part III.B.3.
18 See infra Part III.C.1.
19 See, e.g., Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 461 (2007); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of
Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271 (2009); John D.
King, Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the Adjudication of Misdemeanors in the
United States, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (Erik Luna & Marianne
L. Wade eds., 2012); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012); Jenny
Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011). Although this vibrant misdemeanor literature is largely quite
recent, the significance of petty offense prosecutions in the criminal justice system has received
intermittent interest. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:
HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 9–11 (1979); ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 190–91 (1930); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN.
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 128 (1967), available at
15
16
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To be sure, commentators have increasingly criticized the
harshness of current immigration laws, which impose banishment with
little consideration of mitigating factors, even where the underlying
offense is not serious. 21 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the
severity of deportation as the nearly inevitable result of many minor
criminal convictions, taking the opportunity in Padilla v. Kentucky to
endorse “creative[]” plea bargains, crafted to avoid harsh immigration
consequences in appropriate cases. 22 But neither the Court nor the
literature has adequately appreciated the dire situation facing the
noncitizen trapped at the intersection of expansive, aggressively
enforced federal immigration laws and state petty-offense processing.
This Article explores the impact of these forces on misdemeanor
defendants and the ramifications for current deportation policy,
criminal justice systems, and communities.
Part I describes how recent changes to immigration law have
expanded the range of criminal offenses leading to deportation and
other immigration consequences while at the same time curbing the
possibility of post-conviction discretionary relief at both state and
federal levels. As the proliferation of federal enforcement initiatives at
various access points in the state criminal justice system increases the
pipeline from criminal arrests to federal removal proceedings, the
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf; Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its
Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956).
20 There are a few notable exceptions. See Chin, supra note 17 (describing generally how
state criminal process laws take immigration status into account in ways that sometimes
disadvantage noncitizens); Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO
L. REV. 585 (2011) (arguing that noncitizens facing petty charges that may lead to deportation
must be provided with counsel). But even these articles do not thoroughly explore the specific
challenges facing noncitizens prosecuted in the lower criminal courts. In particular, the effect of
the immigration enforcement programs on noncitizens’ plea-bargain choices has garnered no
academic focus whatsoever.
21 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1843–44 (2007) (discussing the rise of punitive
penalties relating to immigration violations); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the
Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L.
& COM. REG. 639, 651–52 (2004) (“[W]e live in a time of extreme ‘vigor, efficiency, and
strictness’ as to deportation of non-citizens convicted of crimes, due to nearly two decades of
sustained attention to this issue.” (footnote omitted)); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 469, 482–86 (2007) (discussing the increasingly severe immigration consequences that
follow from noncitizens’ criminal convictions); William G. Paul, America’s Harsh and Unjust
Immigration Laws, USA TODAY MAGAZINE, July 1, 2000, at 14 (arguing that current
immigration law in America is unjust and punishes noncitizens with deportation for minor
offenses in a system that does not meet due process standards).
22 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010); see also Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1492 n.10 (2012)
(“Armed with knowledge that a guilty plea would preclude travel abroad, aliens like Vartelas
might endeavor to negotiate a plea to a nonexcludable offense—in Vartelas’ case, e.g.,
possession of counterfeit securities . . . .”).
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resulting scheme is one in which petty convictions, or mere petty
arrests, frequently lead to banishment.
Part II turns to the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Padilla that the
institutional actors in state criminal proceedings might appropriately
mitigate the current federal immigration scheme in the minor cases
where deportation seems most disproportional. Part II then briefly
outlines the options available to “creatively” structure pleas to avoid
negative immigration consequences.
As Part III demonstrates, however, in the petty cases where the
disparity between the underlying offense and the deportation
consequence is greatest, entrenched institutional norms frustrate the
sort of negotiation for immigration-safe dispositions envisioned by the
Padilla Court. Hasty, ill-informed pleas, with little individualized
equitable consideration, are par for the course whether counsel is
appointed or not. And in the thousands of jurisdictions where ICE has
access to state defendants, even informed noncitizens take “bad” pleas,
motivated more by the desire to avoid contact with immigration
authorities than by the strength of the prosecutor’s case.
Part IV considers the implications of this analysis for deportation
policy and criminal justice. Because misdemeanor plea bargaining
usually does not adequately account for disproportionate immigration
consequences, other measures remain necessary to address the disparity
between the minor offenses and the severity of deportation as an
automatic consequence. Critically, misdemeanor convictions have
become increasingly unreliable indicators of guilt, especially where the
integration of immigration enforcement with the state criminal
apparatus makes fighting the charges seem too risky or futile. Part V
assesses a few possibilities for reform that might begin to address the
compromised integrity of both federal and state systems.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
AGAINST NONCITIZENS CHARGED WITH MINOR CRIMES
The Obama Administration, like the Bush and Clinton
Administrations before it, prioritizes the apprehension and removal of
noncitizens with criminal history, and particularly those convicted of
serious offenses. 23 But although the federal government has increased

23 See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to All ICE
Employees, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and
Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Morton, Enforcement Priorities Memo], available
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/civil-imm-enforcement-priorities_
app-detn-reml-aliens.pdf (outlining the government’s enforcement priorities). The Clinton
Administration initiated the first major concerted effort to deport noncitizens on criminal
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deportations of noncitizens with some criminal history in the last ten
years, 24 very few of the total 400,000 noncitizens deported annually are
removed on the basis of serious offenses. 25 Rather than targeting the
worst offenders, enhanced immigration enforcement appears primarily
to yield increased numbers of noncitizens with only minor convictions
or no criminal record at all.
A.

The Expanding Immigration Consequences of Minor Convictions

Lawfully present noncitizens become removable when their
convictions match up with one of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s
(INA) categories of deportable offenses. 26 In the 1990s, Congress widely
expanded these categories and sharply constricted opportunities for
discretionary post-conviction relief from removal at both the federal
and state levels. 27 The broader categories discussed below—aggravated
felonies, crimes involving moral turpitude, and controlled substance
convictions—now sweep in many minor offenses.
When Congress first enacted the aggravated felony removal
category in 1988, only three serious crimes were included: murder, drug
trafficking, and firearms trafficking. 28 The current list—now at twentyeight offenses, 29 some of which create further sub-categories30—includes
grounds. See Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration
Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1135–36 (2002).
24 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reports that it removed approximately
188,000 “criminal aliens” in 2011. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2011, at 1, 6 tbl.7
(2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/
enforcement_ar_2011.pdf. To put that number in historical perspective, consider that from
1908 to 1980 the United States deported a total of 56,669 noncitizens based on criminal history.
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 187 tbl.67, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1997YB.pdf (indicating that between
1908 and 1980, 48,330 noncitizens were deported for “criminal violations” and another 8,339
were deported for “narcotics violations”).
25 Spencer S. Hsu & Andrew Becker, Immigration Officials Set Quotas to Boost Deportation
Numbers, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2010, at A04 (discussing the disparity between the Department
of Homeland Security’s directive that enforcement should focus on “the most dangerous illegal
immigrants” and the practices of lower-ranked ICE officials).
26 See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1938–41 (2000).
27 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18,
and 28 U.S.C.); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Immigration Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
28 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342, 7344(a), 102 Stat. 4181,
4469–71 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012)).
29 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U).
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crimes that are neither aggravated nor felonies under criminal law. 31
Misdemeanor drug possession with a one-year sentence can qualify as
an aggravated felony, 32 as does a year of probation with a suspended
sentence for pulling hair—a misdemeanor under Georgia law. 33
Convictions for selling ten dollars worth of marijuana, theft of a tendollar video game, shoplifting fifteen dollars worth of baby clothes, and
forging a check for less than twenty dollars have all been held to be
aggravated felonies. 34 Aggravated felonies trigger mandatory detention,
deportation without the possibility of almost all forms of discretionary
relief, including asylum 35 and cancellation of removal, 36 and a
permanent bar on lawful reentry. 37
Another deportation category that includes relatively minor state
offenses is the crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Under current
law, so long as a sentence of one year or more could be imposed, a lawful
permanent resident (LPR) is deportable for a CIMT conviction within
five years of admission, even if the actual punishment levied consists
only of a fine or community service. 38 An LPR with two CIMTs is
deportable regardless of whether either was committed within five years
of admission. 39 CIMTs include theft of services offenses like turnstile
jumping, 40 misdemeanor indecent exposure, 41 petty shoplifting
offenses, 42 and other crimes that states do not significantly punish. 43
30 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (crimes of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16 “for
which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year”); id. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft offenses “for
which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year”).
31 See generally Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and the Lost
Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 673–75 (2008) (citing scholarship critical of the
aggravated felony category, and summarizing some of the litigation produced by its broad
categories).
32 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2589–90 (2010) (holding that a simple
possession misdemeanor offense may qualify as an aggravated felony if charged as a recidivist
offense).
33 See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: “This Has Got Me in Some Kind of
Whirlwind,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2000, at A13 (describing a woman facing deportation on the
basis of a misdemeanor battery conviction for pulling another woman’s hair in a quarrel over a
man a decade before the aggravated felony law was passed).
34 See Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 8–9, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651).
35 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)–(B).
36 See id. §§ 1229a(a)(3), (b)(1)(C).
37 See id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (“Any alien . . . who again seeks admission . . . at any time in
the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony[] is inadmissible.”).
38 See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
39 See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
40 See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
41 See In re Cortes Medina, 26 I. & N. Dec. 79 (B.I.A. 2013) (holding that CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 314(1) (2012), which includes misdemeanor-level indecent exposure violations, is a CIMT).
42 Da Rosa Silva v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1011 (E.D.
Pa. 2003) (holding that shoplifting is a crime constituting moral turpitude).
43 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-2.4 (West 2013) (classifying the offense of passing bad
checks as a “disorderly persons offense”); Baer v. Norene, 79 F.2d 340, 341 (9th Cir. 1935)
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LPRs deportable under this provision also tend to be foreclosed from
establishing the seven years residency requirement for discretionary
relief. 44
Finally, although many states punish misdemeanor drug offenses
only with small fines, 45 any controlled substance offense makes lawfully
present noncitizens deportable, with the narrow exception of a single
conviction for simple possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana. 46
According to the Department of Homeland Security, drug crimes
(including manufacturing, possession, and distribution offenses)
accounted for twenty-three percent of all criminal deportations in
2011, 47 and an even higher percentage in prior years. 48 Additionally, the
INA deems noncitizens (including LPRs) with any controlled substance
violations who sojourn abroad, however briefly, to be seeking entry
upon return. 49 In other words, the noncitizen is stripped of lawful status
and treated as if requesting admission to the United States for the first
time. 50 There is no petty offense exception; no waiver available; no
consideration of length of residence or strength of community ties; and
the returning LPR may be subject to mandatory detention. 51

(describing check forgery as an offense that involves moral turpitude); Susan L. Pilcher, Justice
Without a Blindfold: Criminal Proceedings and the Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REV. 269, 312–
13 (1997) (explaining that passing bad checks is a crime that may involve moral turpitude
under deportation law).
44 Morawetz, supra note 26, at 1941 (observing that commission of a crime stops
accumulation of seven years residence for purposes of qualifying for cancellation of removal).
See generally infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria for cancellation
of removal).
45 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1818-406(1) (2012); MINN. STAT. § 152.027(4) (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.336 (2011); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-10(a)(4) (West 2013); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 221.05, .10 (McKinney 2013).
46 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
47 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 24, at 6 tbl.7.
48 See id. at 6 tbl.7 (showing that drug offenses accounted for over twenty-five percent of
removals in 2010 and almost thirty percent in 2009).
49 Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479,1483 (2012) (recognizing that after the 1996 legislation
a lawful permanent resident with a controlled substance offense who “return[s] from a sojourn
abroad, however brief, may be permanently removed from the United States” (citing 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), 1182(a)(2))).
50 One of my former clients, an LPR of forty years, was detained without bond and put into
removal proceedings following a thirteen-day European cruise with his family. He had
previously been arrested and issued a Desk Appearance Ticket for possession of marijuana, to
which he pled guilty and paid a twenty-five dollar fine. ICE alleged that the offense stripped
him of his lawful status and subjected him to the controlled substance inadmissibility ground,
for which there is no waiver.
51 The mandatory detention rule applies if the returning LPR was released from penal
custody for the offense any time after October 8, 1998. See Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1490–92
(holding that the rule subjecting a returning resident with a controlled substance offense to the
INA’s inadmissibility grounds is not retroactive to convictions entered before the statutory
enactment in 1996); MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY:
A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS 150, 313 (4th ed. 2009).
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Beyond these broad categories of removable convictions, the
federal government expands the deportation consequences of criminal
offenses in other ways. For instance, federal law treats deferred
adjudication programs as convictions for immigration purposes if the
defendant must plead guilty to qualify. 52 This rule primarily affects
whether diversionary alternatives for noncitizens involved in minor
drug or domestic violence offenses will still result in deportation. 53
While expanding removable offense categories over the last two
decades, Congress has significantly curtailed the opportunities for both
state and federal agency officials to exercise post-conviction discretion
to mitigate immigration consequences where warranted. 54 Before 1996,
immigration judges were authorized by section 212(c) of the INA to
determine whether deportation was warranted in individual cases based
on factors like the nature of the offense, the length of the noncitizen’s
residence, the hardship to family members that would be caused by the
noncitizen’s deportation, evidence of rehabilitation, and so forth. 55 As
the Supreme Court noted in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
St. Cyr, more than half of all deportable residents seeking 212(c) relief
prevailed. 56 Cancellation of removal, the closest current analogue, is
available to LPRs only if they have lawfully resided in the United States
for at least seven years. 57 As noted, any conviction that federal law
defines as an aggravated felony (even if only a misdemeanor under state
law) bars cancellation of removal relief, regardless of the length of lawful
residence or the strength of the equities. 58

52 See COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS, N.Y.C. BAR, THE IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES OF DEFERRED ADJUDICATION PROGRAMS IN NEW YORK CITY 1–4 (2007),
available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Immigration.pdf; Jason A. Cade, Deporting the
Pardoned, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355, 380–81, 394–96 (2012) (discussing how federal
immigration law interferes with states’ goals in offering deferred adjudication programs).
53 Many states require a plea of guilty before a defendant can enter a diversionary program.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2 (2012) (declaring that the drug treatment diversionary
program requires a guilty plea); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1068 (2012) (same); id. § 769.4a
(declaring that the domestic violence diversionary program requires a guilty plea); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 216.05 (McKinney 2013) (declaring that drug treatment diversionary program
requires a guilty plea); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A § 3-452 (2012) (same).
54 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479–80 (discussing the elimination of
212(c) relief and JRADs).
55 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82–414, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163,
187, repealed by IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597
(1996).
56 533 U.S. 289, 295–96 & n.5 (2001).
57 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012). Once noncitizens are placed into removal proceedings, or
commit certain offenses, they can no longer accrue time in the United States qualifying them
for cancellation of removal. See id. § 1229b(d)(1).
58 Id. § 1229b(a)(3).
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For non-LPRs, the requirements for discretionary relief from
removal are even more demanding. 59 Furthermore, misdemeanors can
foreclose a non-LPR’s eligibility for temporary relief programs such as
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) or Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA). TPS is statutorily available to noncitizens from
designated countries on the basis of severe natural disasters or political
strife. 60 The Obama Administration implemented DACA on August 15,
2012 to allow certain young people to avoid deportation and work
lawfully for two years, subject to renewal. 61 Additionally, deported
noncitizens with a criminal history, even if very minor, generally have
great difficulty lawfully returning to the United States even if otherwise
eligible for an immigrant visa.
Congress has also repealed the authority that it previously granted
state criminal judges to make a recommendation against deportation at
the time of sentencing. 62 Though sparingly used, Judicial
Recommendations Against Deportation (JRADs) were consistently
interpreted as giving the sentencing judge “conclusive authority to
decide whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis
for deportation.” 63 Similarly, some federal agencies and courts have
interpreted federal immigration law to limit the effect of executive
pardons or judicial expungements on the immigration consequences of
convictions. 64 Elsewhere I have argued that Congress did not clearly
intend to override the states’ sovereign authority to determine the
continuing validity of their own convictions through all of these
mechanisms. 65 But the fact remains that under current law there is little
potential for discretionary post-conviction processes in either the state
or the federal system to avert deportation on the basis of relatively
minor crimes.
59 See id. § 1229b(b)(1) (requiring ten years of physical presence and a showing of
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to qualifying family members).
60 See id. § 1254 (describing requirements for Temporary Protected Status); id.
§ 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i) (providing that noncitizens are ineligible for Temporary Protected Status if
convicted of two misdemeanors). But cf. 8 C.F.R. § 244.1 (2012) (“[A]ny crime punishable by
imprisonment for a maximum term of five days or less shall not be considered a felony or
misdemeanor.”).
61 See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243
c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=f2ef2f19470f7310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=
f2ef2f19470f7310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated Jan. 18, 2013) (outlining
eligibility requirements for DACA and explaining that a youth with three or more
misdemeanors or a single “significant” misdemeanor becomes ineligible for the program).
62 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479–80 (2010) (discussing the fact that from 1917
to 1990, Congress authorized sentencing judges, in either state or federal prosecutions for
crimes involving moral turpitude, to make a recommendation that the alien not be deported).
63 Id. at 1479 (quoting Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986)); Taylor &
Wright, supra note 23, at 1148 (noting JRADs were not widely used even when authorized).
64 See generally Cade, supra note 52, at 414.
65 Id. at 406–12.
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In sum, even minor convictions may trigger removal for lawfully
present noncitizens or foreclose discretionary paths to lawful status that
would otherwise be available to undocumented residents. Consequently,
the integrity of the criminal justice process is critical to ensure that the
resulting immigration consequences are justified.
B.

The Integration of Immigration Enforcement with the Criminal
Justice System

Despite Congress’s multiplication of the criminal offenses that
trigger deportation over the last fifteen years, the actual apprehension
and removal of noncitizens with criminal records has presented a
challenge, in part because the vast majority of criminal prosecutions
occur in state and local courts. 66 In the last decade, and particularly the
last five years, the federal government has attempted to meet the
challenge of enforcing immigration law against noncitizens with nonfederal convictions through a number of programs that increase
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) access to state and
local defendants. 67 Federal funding for these interior enforcement
programs reached $690.2 million in 2011, thirty times the amount
appropriated in 2004. 68
ICE currently operates three major enforcement initiatives to
identify noncitizens who encounter state and local criminal justice
systems for possible criminal grounds of removal or immigration
violations: the Criminal Alien Program, Secure Communities, and
certain section 287(g) programs. Although the various programs
function differently, each relies to some degree on state and local law
enforcement to facilitate ICE’s initiation of removal proceedings against
noncitizen arrestees.
66 See Peter H. Schuck, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism,
22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367 (1999) (describing the historical “failures” of the immigration
system at identifying and removing noncitizens convicted of crimes in state and local courts).
In 2012, for example, the government reported a total of 167,496 new federal prosecutions.
Custom Reports—TRAC Data Interpreter, Prosecutions for Fiscal Year 2012, TRAC REPORTS,
http://trac.syr.edu/cgi-bin/product/interpreter.pl?p_stat=fil&p_series=annual (last visited Feb.
13, 2013). In contrast, each of the fifty states typically prosecutes more than 100,000 cases per
year, and larger states like New York and California prosecute as many as ten times that
amount. See generally State Court Caseloads Tables 2010, Criminal—Total Caseloads, COURT
STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/
CSP/SCCS/2010/Total_Criminal_Caseloads.ashx (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
67 See IMMIGRATION CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET:
ICE AGREEMENTS OF COOPERATION IN COMMUNITIES TO ENHANCE SAFETY AND SECURITY
(2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/pdf/access.pdf.
68 See MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42057,
INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 25 (2012),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42057.pdf.
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The Criminal Alien Program (CAP) includes various systems for
identifying and initiating removal proceedings against deportable
noncitizens. CAP’s primary function is to screen foreign-born convicts
and detainees in every prison and jail throughout the country. 69 In
addition to conducting in-person interviews inside prisons and jails,
CAP’s 7854 employees interview inmates by videoconference, check
inmate roster data provided by correctional departments against
immigration databases, and perform other operations. 70 If it appears an
incarcerated defendant may be deportable following this screening, ICE
will issue an “immigration detainer,” which asks law enforcement to
confine the person for up to another forty-eight hours beyond the time
he would have been released, until ICE has a chance to assume
custody. 71 In Part III of this Article I discuss the influence of detainers
on plea bargaining, but it is worth observing here that the applicable
statute and regulations do not require any evidentiary standard for their
issuance. 72
The Secure Communities program is even more intertwined with
law enforcement. Introduced by President Bush in 2008 and expanded
under President Obama, 73 Secure Communities capitalizes on the
potential for electronic data sharing across federal agencies. When local
police in a Secure Communities jurisdiction submit arrestees’
fingerprints to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) database to check
for criminal background and outstanding warrants, the FBI then
forwards the prints to DHS where they are screened for criminal history

Id. at 14.
Id. at 14–15; see also Declaration of Jamison Matuszewski ¶¶ 18–22, at 6–8, Am.
Immigration Council v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 12-00355 (D. Conn. July 12, 2012)
[hereinafter Matuszewski Declaration], available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/
default/files/docs/lac/27-2_Matuszewski_Declaration_%282%29.pdf.
71 “A detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the Department seeks
custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and
removing the alien.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2012). The forty-eight hour period is not discounted
by holidays or weekends. Id. § 287.7(d). Chris Lasch has analyzed the scope of statutory
authority for immigration detainers in two informative articles. See Christopher N. Lasch,
Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 164 (2008); Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After
Arizona v. United States, 46 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2178524.
72 Immigration officers must only have a “reason to believe” that the arrestee is a
noncitizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 287.7; see also Matuszewski Declaration,
supra note 70, ¶ 22, at 8 (“[I]n FY2011 there were 701,473 ‘CAP encounters,’ of which 221,122
resulted in arrests. An arrest occurs when an ICE agent believes, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that the suspect is in violation of U.S. immigration law.”).
73 AARTI KOHLI ET AL., CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POL’Y, SECURE
COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1 (2011),
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf.
69
70
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and immigration violations. 74 If the arrestee appears to be removable,
ICE can issue a detainer.
Finally, a program enacted in 1996 under section 287(g) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, empowers the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to train local law enforcement agents to
investigate, apprehend, and detain deportable noncitizens. 75 Although
only two states had entered into section 287(g) agreements in 2003, 76
ICE boasts partnerships under the program with thirty-nine law
enforcement agencies in nineteen states as of December 31, 2012. 77
More than half of currently active section 287(g) agreements are jail
enforcement programs, in which the deputized officers interview and
screen foreign-born detainees using the same immigration databases as
CAP agents. 78
As a result of ramped up immigration enforcement efforts, the
state-to-federal pipeline of deportable noncitizens has swelled
tremendously over the last five years. Despite the little attention it has
received, CAP appears to be the workhorse of the federal enforcement
programs. CAP now actively screens in all federal and state correctional
institutions and in 99.6% of county jails. 79 According to ICE, in 2011
there were 701,473 CAP “encounters” (interviews and data screening)
leading to 221,122 immigration arrests. 80 The Congressional Research
Service reports that CAP led to well over one million immigration
arrests from 2007 to 2011. 81 The section 287(g) program, in contrast,
identified about 200,000 potentially removable aliens in that same time

See ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 68, at 15.
See Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/
library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited April 15, 2013) [hereinafter Fact Sheet: Delegation of
Immigration Authority].
76 Michele Waslin, Immigration Enforcement by State and Local Police: The Impact on the
Enforcers and Their Communities, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY
ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES 97, 102–03 (Monica W. Varsanyi ed., 2010) (stating that
Florida and Alabama became the first states to enter into section 287(g) agreements, in 2002
and 2003, respectively).
77 See Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority, supra note 75.
78 See ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 68, at 16.
79 The Criminal Alien Program (CAP): Immigration Enforcement in Prisons and Jails, AM.
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL—IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.immigration
policy.org/just-facts/criminal-alien-program-cap-immigration-enforcement-prisons-and-jails
(“CAP boasts 100% screening to all sentenced inmates in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facilities and
all state correctional institutions and in FY 2012, according to the Criminal Alien Program Risk
Assessment (CAPRA), 3,054 of 3,066 county jails (99.6%) received 100% screening.”); see also
ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 68, at 14–18.
80 See Matuszewski Declaration, supra note 70, ¶ 22, at 8.
81 See ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 68, at 25 tbl.6.
74
75
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period. 82 In 2011, there were 33,180 arrests through section 287(g), a
four year low. 83
As of August 2012, Secure Communities was active in over 3074
jurisdictions in fifty states. 84 Due to its comparative efficiency, Secure
Communities has quickly become the primary identifier of potentially
deportable noncitizens, leading to 348,970 such identifications in 2011. 85
Because CAP and section 287(g) officers effectuate many (but not all) of
the immigration arrests that follow identifications made through Secure
Communities, the cumulative data of arrests across the three programs
undoubtedly includes some double-counting. 86 Nevertheless, the
programs mark huge numbers of noncitizens as potentially deportable.
By the end of 2013, CAP and Secure Communities together will be able
to screen 100% of the country’s jails and prisons. 87
Time and again the Obama administration has touted these
enforcement initiatives as necessary for preventing crime and deporting
serious criminals. 88 ICE’s website asserts that programs like CAP and
Secure Communities “focus[] federal resources on . . . identifying and
removing high-risk criminal aliens.” 89 According to Homeland Security
Secretary Janet Napolitano, the federal government’s enforcement
policy “focus[es] on deporting the worst offenders, including national
security risks, criminal convicts and those who repeatedly violate

Id.
Id. ICE requested $17 million dollars less funding for section 287(g) for FY2013 than it
received in the prior four years, evidencing the shrinking priority placed on the program as
compared to CAP and Secure Communities. Id. at 24 tbl.5.
84 See IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS (2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/
pdf/sc-activated2.pdf. This is a dramatic increase since 2010, when Secure Communities was
active in only 116 jurisdictions and sixteen states. See DET. WATCH NETWORK, FAMILIES FOR
FREEDOM, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT & NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS
GUILD, DEPORTATION 101: A COMMUNITY RESOURCE ON ANTI-DEPORTATION EDUCATION AND
ORGANIZING 9 (2010).
85 ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 68, at 25 tbl. 6. As the Congressional Research report
notes, some of the arrest data across the programs is likely double-counted because the Secure
Communities program identifies deportable noncitizens but does not make arrests itself. Id. at
26. Thus, arrests following Secure Communities identifications will often (but not always) be
made by field officers in the CAP or section 287(g) programs. Id.
86 Id. at 26. Additionally, the same individual may be arrested or identified multiple times,
leading to further over-counts. Id.
87 Id. at 15 (citing ICE’s Congressional Budget Justifications for FY2013).
88 See, e.g., Sam Dolnick, In Change, Mayor Backs Obstacle to Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 2011, at A19 (“[T]he Obama administration has placed a priority on deporting noncitizen
criminals who pose a threat to the public, while focusing less on illegal immigrants who do not
pose a threat.”); President Barack Obama, Remarks on Comprehensive Immigration Reform in
El Paso, Texas (May 10, 2011) (“We’re focusing our limited resources and people on violent
offenders and people convicted of crimes . . . .”), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2011/05/10/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-reform-el-paso-texas.
89 See IMMIGRATION CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 67, at 2.
82
83
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immigration laws.” 90 ICE spokeswoman Virginia Kice has defended
immigration detainers on the grounds that they ensure that noncitizens
with convictions “are not released back into the community to
potentially commit more crimes.”91 The federal government has
repeatedly made similar statements in press releases and Congressional
hearings. 92
In Part III.C, I discuss how the immigration jail enforcement
programs can distort the plea-bargain incentives in minor cases. The
point I wish to observe here is that despite the federal government’s
rhetoric, there is little evidence that such programs effectively target the
worst offenders. Rather, most of the noncitizens placed into removal
proceedings through the jail enforcement programs have only minor
criminal convictions or no criminal record at all. In 2009, Homeland
Security Secretary Napolitano’s advisor issued a report finding the ICE
initiatives had no discernible effect on the number of noncitizens with
criminal history taken into custody, though they did increase
apprehension of non-criminal immigrants. 93 Indeed, as the total
number of arrests through these programs has increased each year since
2006, the proportion involving noncitizens with serious convictions has
steadily declined while arrests of those without any criminal records
have steadily risen. 94 Even within the group of individuals who enter

90

A1.

Julia Preston, U.S. to Review Cases Seeking Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, at

91 See Paloma Esquivel & Lee Romney, Two L.A. Officials Target Deportation Program, L.A.
TIMES, May 26, 2011, at 3 (quoting Virginia Kice, a spokesperson for ICE).
92 See, e.g., Is Secure Communities Keeping Our Communities Secure?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration Policy & Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
11 (2011) (statement of Gary Mead, Exec. Assistant Dir. for Enforcement and Removal
Operations, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement), available at http://judiciary.
house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-69_71404.PDF; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Press
Release, Sec. Napolitano’s Remarks on Smart Effective Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/10/05/secretarynapolitanos-remarks-smart-effective-border-security-and-immigration (“We established, as a
top priority, the identification and removal of public safety and national security threats. To
execute on this, we expanded the use and frequency of investigations and programs, like Secure
Communities, that track down criminals and gang members on our streets and in our jails.”);
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Press Release, ICE Unveils Sweeping New Plan to
Target Criminal Aliens in Jails Nationwide (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/
news/releases/0803/080328washington.htm (describing Secure Communities as “an historic
opportunity to transform immigration enforcement and improve public safety by focusing on
those aliens who pose the greatest threats to our communities” (quoting Julie L. Myer, Assistant
Secretary, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement)).
93 DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT: IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2009),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf.
94 ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 68, at 32 (“[A]s the number of arrests [under the
section 287(g) program] increased between FY2006 and FY2011, the proportions of arrests
involving Level 1 criminal aliens declined, while those for noncriminal arrests
increased. . . . Slightly over half of the aliens removed and returned as a result of Secure
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deportation proceedings through the ICE enforcement programs
following a criminal arrest, most have no criminal record, or only one or
two misdemeanor convictions. 95 In 2011, for example, fifty-one percent
of noncitizens arrested following identification by the section 287(g)
program had no convictions, while twenty-one percent had only one or
two misdemeanors. 96 By contrast, thirteen percent had three or more
misdemeanors or one non-aggravated felony, and only sixteen percent
of those identified through section 287(g) were in the government’s
highest criminal removal priority (those convicted of an aggravated
felony or two or more regular felonies). 97 As for the removals and
returns effectuated through the Secure Communities program in 2011,
twenty-five percent had no criminal record, twenty-nine percent had
one or two misdemeanors, twenty percent had three or more
misdemeanors or one non-aggravated felony, and twenty-six percent
had one aggravated felony or at least two regular felonies. 98 (It bears
repeating that aggravated felonies include offenses that are neither
felonious nor aggravated. 99) Similar data does not appear to be publicly
available for CAP. 100
While the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in immigration court
has the potential to play a significant role in how immigration law is
enforced against noncitizens with minor criminal history, immigration
prosecutors may lack sufficient incentives to exercise much
discretion. 101 Further, the institutional culture of immigration officers
Communities have been Level 3 criminals . . . with the proportions . . . falling during each year
for which data are available.”).
95 Id. at 32 tbl.8 (showing statistics for arrests under the Secure Communities and section
287(g) programs by type of offense from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2012).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 29–37. In both 2010 and 2011, around four percent or
fewer of all noncitizens in deportation proceedings (not just those from the immigration
enforcement programs) were alleged to be aggravated felons. See Deportation Orders Sought in
Immigration Court Based on Alleged Criminal Activity by Type, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/281/include/depordertype.html (last updated Mar. 28,
2012).
100 See Matuszewski Declaration, supra note 70, ¶ 23, at 8 (“Although ICE tracks the
cumulative number of ‘CAP encounters,’ it does not have any supporting details that would
allow it to identify the individuals encountered by CAP and retrieve their records, nor are any
files identified as ‘CAP files.’”).
101 As Professor Nancy Morawetz has explained:
In criminal cases the criminal prosecutor has to think about the strength of the
evidence, the difficulty of proceeding with the case, and the prosecutorial priorities of
the office. In contrast in immigration, it tends to be little work to have the case
proceed in court. As a result, there are no institutional disincentives to having the
immigration court dispose of the case. As a practical matter, once someone is in
[removal] proceedings, it is easier for the ICE trial attorney to prove removal than it
is to write a memo to get superiors to agree to exercise discretion.
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and prosecutors is decidedly enforcement-oriented. 102 Indeed, although
ICE Director John Morton issued two agency memoranda in 2011
providing guidelines for ICE officers and prosecutors to target serious
criminal offenders, 103 there has been very little discernible change in
policy on the ground, due at least in part to internal agency resistance. 104
In the year following the issuance of the Morton memos, ICE closed less
than 1.5% of pending cases, 105 and the backlog of pending matters in
immigration court continues to rise. 106
It may be, of course, that the federal government’s true priorities in
implementing the enforcement programs differ from those expressed in
its public statements. 107 And certainly the administration has made clear
that ICE officers may continue to “pursue the removal of any alien
unlawfully in the United States,” although it has also emphasized that

Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 278 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Telephone Interview by Shoba
Wadhia with Nancy Morawetz, Immigration Scholar and Professor, New York University (July
15, 2009)).
102 See, e.g., Memorandum from James M. Chapparo, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to Field Office Directors and Deputy Field Office Directors, U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, Keep up the Good Work on Criminal Alien Removals (Feb. 22, 2010),
available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/ICEdocument032
710.pdf (encouraging ICE officers to put more noncitizens into removal proceedings through
CAP regardless of criminal record).
103 See Morton, Enforcement Priorities Memo, supra note 23; Memorandum from John
Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to Field Office Directors, Special
Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the
Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 4–5 (June 17, 2011), available
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
104 See AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N & AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, HOLDING DHS
ACCOUNTABLE ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 6–11 (2011), available at http://www.aila.org/
content/default.aspx?docid=37615 (reporting that the majority of ground-level ICE officials
admitted that they were not following the prosecutorial discretion guidelines in the Morton
memoranda); Julia Preston, Agents’ Union Delays Training on New Policy on Deportation, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2012, at A15 (reporting that the National ICE Counsel—the union representing
ICE agents—refused to allow their members to participate in prosecutorial discretion
trainings).
105 See Meghan McCarthy, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion’ Barely Dents Immigration Case Backlog,
TUCSON SENTINEL (July 15, 2012), http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/071512_immig_
cases/prosecutorial-discretion-barely-dents-immigration-case-backlog.
106 See Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/
immigration/court_backlog (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (reporting that the backlog rose from
297,551 in September 2011 to 325,044 in September 2012).
107 In an important empirical study of the county-by-county roll-out of Secure
Communities, Adam Cox and Thomas Miles present data that undercuts the government’s
claim that the program’s focus is on reducing crime. Their analysis demonstrates that the size
of a county’s Hispanic population (even controlling for other variables like the foreign-born
population or proximity to the border), rather than the county’s crime rates, was the most
reliable indicator for early Secure Communities activation. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J.
Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 102–03,
122–40), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2109820.
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“attention to those aliens should not displace or disrupt the resources
needed to remove aliens who are a higher priority.” 108
In any event, the upshot is that the federal government’s
rhetoric—that it focuses immigration enforcement on the most serious
offenders—doesn’t map well onto the reality. Instead, the expansion of
removal categories, followed by more aggressive immigration
enforcement initiatives, appears to have primarily facilitated increased
removals of noncitizens with convictions for minor offenses, including
misdemeanors, or no criminal history. Dragnet jail enforcement
programs easily sweep up enough deportable noncitizens who
encounter criminal justice systems, whether or not they have serious
convictions, to max-out the federal government’s capacity of removing
400,000 noncitizens per year. 109
As I argue below, the expanded apprehension of deportable
noncitizens with little or no criminal history comes at other, perhaps
unforeseen costs. By imposing onerous process costs and skewing pleabargain incentives in minor cases, the current implementation of jail
enforcement programs may undermine the integrity of both
misdemeanor convictions and immigration consequences imposed on
the basis of minor offenses.
II. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY AND PLEA BARGAINING FOR
IMMIGRATION-SAFE OUTCOMES
The harsh, unforgiving consequences of the immigration laws
enacted in the 1990s, especially for noncitizens convicted of crimes,
have become increasingly apparent. 110 Even the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the severity of deportation as an unavoidable penalty for
relatively minor offenses, taking the opportunity in Padilla v. Kentucky
to suggest that defendants and prosecutors fashion pleas to avoid
108 Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to
All ICE Employees, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension,
Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 30, 2010), available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/
detention-reform/pdf/civil_enforcement_priorities.pdf.
109 See Morton, Enforcement Priorities Memo, supra note 23, at 1 (stating that the federal
immigration agencies have institutional capacity to remove about 400,000 noncitizens per
year); cf. Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement,
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1842–49 (2011)
(arguing that the devolution of immigration arrest authority to state and local officials will tend
to subvert the federal government’s ability to set enforcement priorities).
110 See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 21, at 1844–45 (discussing the rise of punitive penalties
relating to immigration); Kanstroom, supra note 21, at 651–52 (“[W]e live in a time of extreme
‘vigor, efficiency, and strictness’ as to deportation of non-citizens convicted of crimes, due to
nearly two decades of sustained attention to this issue.”); Legomsky, supra note 21, at 482–86
(discussing the increasingly severe immigration consequences that follow from noncitizens’
criminal convictions).
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deportation in appropriate cases. 111 This Part briefly discusses the
Padilla decision and provides examples of ways that plea bargains can
be structured to avoid immigration consequences.
A.

The Padilla Decision

In Padilla, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires
defense counsel to advise noncitizen defendants about the deportation
consequences of a guilty plea. 112 But the Court also anticipated that its
rule would improve the substantive immigration outcomes for
noncitizen defendants, observing that “informed consideration” of the
immigration penalties of a conviction may allow the parties to “plea
bargain creatively . . . in order to craft a conviction and sentence that
reduce the likelihood of deportation.” 113 In other words, the Court
endorsed explicit bargaining in state criminal proceedings to mitigate
some of the harshness of the current federal immigration scheme. 114
Academics and advocates have hailed Padilla as a watershed
decision. 115 The decision’s Sixth Amendment implications have already
generated a voluminous body of scholarship. 116 Few commentators,
however, have evaluated the Padilla Court’s observation that the
interests of the parties in criminal proceedings converge to facilitate plea
111 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481–86 (2010); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
291 (2001) (noting that defense attorneys may be able to negotiate pleas that avoid
deportation).
112 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. But see Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013)
(holding that Padilla v. Kentucky’s conclusion that the Sixth Amendment requires defense
attorneys to inform criminal defendants of the deportation risks of guilty pleas does not apply
retroactively to cases already final on direct review).
113 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486; see also Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much),
58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1395 (2011) (“The majority opinion predicts and intends that the
Padilla rule will change the substantive outcomes of plea bargaining between prosecutors and
the defense . . . .”).
114 Of course, Padilla does not constitutionally require defense counsel to protect her client
from negative immigration consequences, only to apprise the defendant of the deportation risks
of a plea or trial.
115 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2011) (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
last year in Padilla v. Kentucky marks a watershed in the Court’s approach to regulating plea
bargains.”); Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 694 (2011)
(describing Padilla as “monumental for ineffective-assistance jurisprudence”).
116 See, e.g., Lindsay C. Nash, Considering the Scope of Advisal Duties Under Padilla, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 549, 561–70 (2011) (discussing the contours of the Sixth Amendment duty
when the deportation consequences are not clear); Yolanda Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s
Promise: Ensuring Noncitizen Defendants Are Advised of the Immigration Consequences of a
Criminal Conviction, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 169, 193–96 (2011) (discussing the difficulties
inherent in informing defendants about collateral consequences); Derek Wikstrom, “No Logical
Stopping Point”: The Consequences of Padilla v. Kentucky’s Inevitable Expansion, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 351, 361–633 (2012) (discussing the expansion of Padilla to other collateral
consequences).
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bargains crafted to avoid immigration consequences. 117 In a notable
recent exception, Heidi Altman examined the central role played by
prosecutors in plea bargaining over immigration outcomes. 118 Altman
argues that immigration-neutral plea bargains further values that
prosecutors should care about, like proportional justice, conviction
finality, and community safety. 119
Darryl Brown, who has also written about the Padilla decision,
takes a contrasting view of prosecutors’ flexibility. 120 He argues that, at
least with respect to high-volume drug trafficking cases like that of Jose
Padilla, who was caught driving a truck containing 1000 pounds of
marijuana, “no amount of creative negotiation between well-informed
attorneys is likely to yield a disposition that avoids triggering automatic
deportation.” 121 Neither Altman nor Brown focus their attention on the
dynamics of plea bargaining for immigration-safe outcomes in
misdemeanor court, as I endeavor to do in Part III. 122 But before turning
to that I will briefly outline what it means to “creatively” plea bargain to
reduce the likelihood of deportation.
B.

Creative Plea Bargains

The range of charge, fact, and sentence bargaining options
available under criminal law allows prosecutors and defense counsel
wide room to structure pleas. Voluminous criminal dockets and limited
resources necessitate that most prosecutions be resolved through
117 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (“[T]he threat of deportation may provide the defendant with a
powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange
for a dismissal of a charge that does.”).
118 Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice for NonCitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1 (2012).
119 Id.; see also Robert M.A. Johnson, A Prosecutor’s Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla,
31 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 129, 130 (2011) (arguing that Padilla will directly and indirectly
influence prosecutors’ consideration of collateral consequences, presenting an opportunity to
both do “justice and improve public safety”).
120 Brown, supra note 113, at 1400–02.
121 Id. at 1402. Professor Brown may have underestimated the strength of Mr. Padilla’s
bargaining position. After the Supreme Court’s remand in his case, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals vacated his conviction, noting that among other possible defenses, Mr. Padilla could
have argued that as an independent driver he didn’t have permission to inspect the truck
containers. In other words, Mr. Padilla met the prejudice prong for establishing ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 381 S.W.3d 322, 330 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
Moreover, a plea to felony solicitation under Kentucky state law on retrial might allow Padilla
to avoid deportation. See Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 3–4) (on file with author) (discussing Padilla’s options in
the trial court having won his ineffective assistance claim).
122 Alice Clapman has discussed one particularly problematic aspect of petty prosecutions—
the frequent lack of appointed counsel. She argues that Padilla requires the appointment of
counsel in petty prosecutions where immigration consequences might follow. See Clapman,
supra note 20.
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pleas, 123 and few rules constrain prosecutors’ discretion at the pleabargaining stage. 124 Prosecutors have much to gain, professionally and
personally, from negotiating pleas. Trials are significantly more labor
intensive, and their outcomes less certain. 125 “[E]very plea bargain
counts as a win but trials risk being losses.” 126 The state, and the public
too, may prefer the certainty of punishment that comes with plea
bargains. 127 In short, prosecutors have incentives to resolve cases
through pleas, and they are afforded wide latitude to do so.
The expansiveness of criminal codes affords prosecutors
substantial flexibility in charging and bargaining. Prosecutors can
substitute charges that do not require specific intent, mitigating the
immigration consequences of a conviction. 128 They can reduce
substantive charges, for example allowing defendants to plead to
disorderly conduct instead of marijuana possession, or simple
possession instead of purchase. 129 Prosecutors can consolidate separate
counts, or agree to lesser sentences. 130 Even a one-day shorter sentence
can mean the difference between deportation or not (for example, a
sentence of 364 days instead of one year in cases involving crimes of
violence or theft avoids the aggravated felony category). 131
123 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 25 tbl.4.1 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf (showing that ninety-four percent of felony offenders sentenced
in state courts pleaded guilty).
124 See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1025 (2006) (“Despite the significance of prosecutorial power, prosecutors operate with little
oversight or regulation.”); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2475–76 (2004) (explaining that unlike trials, plea bargaining is not
publicly transparent and does not have clear rules governing prosecutors); Josh Bowers, Legal
Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1655, 1705–11 (2010) [hereinafter Bowers, Legal Guilt].
125 Bibas, supra note 124, at 2470–71; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a
Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 50–51(1988).
126 Bibas, supra note 124, at 2471; see also id. at 2472 (“Losses at trial hurt prosecutors’
public images, so prosecutors have incentives to take to trial only extremely strong cases and to
bargain away weak ones.”).
127 Id. at 2472.
128 Crimes of violence only involve moral turpitude if the defendant had a specific intent to
do harm. KRAMER, supra note 51, at 210. Sexual conduct with a minor, for example, is not a
crime of moral turpitude if the defendant could have been convicted under the statute without
a finding that he knew or should have known the victim was a minor. See In re Silva-Trevino,
24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 708 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008).
129 Even where simple possession of marijuana might trigger deportation (for lawfully
present noncitizens, a first offense under thirty grams will not), the defendant may still be
eligible for a waiver. But a marijuana purchase offense may be considered transactional, and
therefore, a trafficking aggravated felony. See KRAMER, supra note 51, at 461–62.
130 Various categories of removability may be triggered where there are multiple counts,
such as crimes involving moral turpitude or controlled substance offenses involving marijuana
possession. See generally id. at 302, 312–13.
131 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2012) (including a crime of violence, as defined by 18
U.S.C. § 16, within the category of aggravated felony if the term of imprisonment imposed is at
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Parties can also affect the potential immigration consequences of
convictions through plea agreements that only trigger deportation
under certain factual scenarios, such as the amount of loss to the victim
in a fraud case. 132 Criminal law tolerates fact-bargaining in plea
negotiations and effective defense attorneys commonly negotiate
changes to the quantity of drugs charged, or to other critical factual
circumstances of the offense. 133 Even within rigid sentencing regimes,
prosecutors and defendants can, and sometimes do, agree to
misrepresent or conceal key facts that would lead to harsher
sentences. 134
One might object that consideration of immigration consequences
in plea bargaining raises fairness concerns. But most pleas can be
structured to avoid deportation without undermining the state’s
criminal justice interests in deterrence and uniform retribution. What
the defendant gains by pleading to an alternate (or lesser) charge
generally can be made up by additional penal sanctions. For example,
increased community service or fines can offset the reduced jail time to
avoid the aggravated felony category. In other situations, allowing the
noncitizen to plead to immigration neutral charges in exchange for an
equal or longer sentence might be an equitable resolution.
Despite the options theoretically available in plea bargaining,
noncitizens face significant structural barriers to effective negotiation
when charged with misdemeanors. As the following Part shows, the
least one year); id. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (including a theft crime within the category of aggravated
felony if the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year); United States v. Shaw, No.
CRIM.A. 99-525-01, Civ.A. 03-6759, 2004 WL 1858336, at *9–11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2004)
(“[I]nstead of imposing concurrent 18 month sentences on all three counts . . . the Court could
have imposed concurrent 9 month sentences on Counts Eight and Nine and a 9 month
consecutive sentence on Count One. If the sentence were structured this way it would not have
triggered the mandatory removal proceedings . . . because defendant’s sentence on each count
individually would not equal or exceed one year.”).
132 See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 42–43 (2009) (holding that immigration judges may
rely on sentencing-related material to determine whether a fraud conviction involved losses
greater than $10,000 and, therefore, would be considered an aggravated felony).
133 See Bibas, supra note 124, at 2484 (noting that the parties can agree to allow the
defendant to plead to “using a telephone in the course of drug trafficking in lieu of a
substantive drug-trafficking charge”); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1117, 1170–71 (2008) [hereinafter Bowers, Punishing the Innocent] (discussing criminal law’s
toleration for legal fictions in plea bargaining, such as allowing defendants to “plead guilty to
daytime burglaries to satisfy lesser charges, even when the crimes indisputably occurred in dark
of night”); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
501, 522, 547 (1992) (describing fact-bargaining cases); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and
Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2557 (2004) (describing “fact
bargaining” about the quantity of drugs that the defendant would plead to possessing).
134 See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 44 (2012) (“Prosecutors
and defense counsel agree to conceal or not disclose aggravating facts to sentencing judges.”);
id. at 191 n.34 (discussing a survey in which federal probation officers reported that “plea
agreements frequently omit or misrepresent relevant facts”).
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Padilla Court’s assumption that the parties will bargain for deportationavoiding dispositions is least likely to occur precisely where the rift
between the gravity of the criminal offense and the ensuing deportation
consequence is largest.
III. THE PLEA-BARGAIN OBSTACLES FOR NONCITIZENS CHARGED
WITH LOW-LEVEL OFFENSES
Padilla recognized that if noncitizens charged with crimes are to
avoid disproportionate outcomes in the current immigration scheme, it
falls to the institutional actors in state criminal proceedings to bargain
around those consequences ex ante. The proportionality principle
underlying the Court’s reasoning is especially salient when applied to
longtime residents charged with minor offenses that carry outsized
deportation consequences. But proportionality concerns also arise for
undocumented or otherwise deportable noncitizens, because minor
convictions may disqualify them from a path to lawful status that would
otherwise be available, or from any chance of lawful return to the
United States in the future.
For both lawfully present and already deportable immigrants, the
misdemeanor system is ill-designed to contend with individual equities
or to evaluate outcomes beyond the immediate penal sanctions.
Paradoxically, noncitizens arrested for low-level offenses that the state
hardly punishes may face more significant structural impediments to
effective plea bargaining for immigration-neutral outcomes than those
accused of more serious crimes.
In the misdemeanor world, the procedural and adversarial
processes that serve to legitimize felony convictions are largely absent.
The dominant systemic norm driving the lower criminal courts is
efficiency, and, as J.D. King surmises, “there is a vast distance between
that value and whichever one comes in second.” 135 Alexandra Natapoff
offers this sobering description: “Massive, underfunded, informal, and
careless, the misdemeanor system propels defendants through in bulk
with scant attention to individualized cases and often without
counsel.”136 The many process costs of misdemeanor adjudication—bail,
King, supra note 19, at 23; see also ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF
33–44, 165–66 (2007) (discussing more generally how the realities
of prosecutorial power and the prevalence of plea bargaining have diminished criminal law’s
constitutional procedural protections); Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1315–16; (“Far from
accidental, the slipshod quality of petty offense processing is a dominant systemic norm that
competes vigorously with and sometimes overwhelms foundational values of due process and
adversarial adjudication.”).
136 Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1315; see also FEELEY, supra note 19, at 10 (“Arrestees were
arraigned in groups and informed of their rights en masse. At times the arrestees were not even
aware that they are [sic] being addressed.”).
135

THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
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pretrial detention, lost wages, multiple court appearances—make
litigating cases to trial difficult, and, for many defendants, outweigh the
possible penal sanctions. 137
The misdemeanor system works poorly for all defendants, but
noncitizens may fare worst of all. First, the institutional features of the
system make it unlikely that noncitizens will be adequately informed
about whether pleas affect their ability to remain in the United States. 138
In spite of Padilla’s mandate, noncitizens commonly plead guilty to
petty offenses without knowing that deportation (and mandatory
detention, or, at the least, a prohibitively high immigration bond) will
result. Even where defendants learn that a plea may result in
immigration consequences, time pressures and other endemic obstacles
frustrate the ability to bargain for immigration-safe dispositions or
mount a defense. Moreover, the ICE enforcement programs tend to
magnify other process costs, further distorting the misdemeanor
system’s ability to sort meritorious prosecutions or reliably adjudicate
guilt. Noncitizens placed under immigration detainers at booking, or
who fear ICE contact in pretrial detention, have a tremendous incentive
to plead guilty as quickly as possible in misdemeanor court, even to
charges that trigger the possibility of additional immigration
consequences, and even if they are innocent or have been subject to
unlawful police practices.
A.

Little or No Information About Immigration Consequences

An estimated ten million misdemeanor prosecutions are filed in
this country every year—four or five times larger than the number of
felonies. 139 In New York, for example, about seventy-five percent of
prosecutions in 2010 and 2011 were for misdemeanors and violations. 140
Latinos and other people of color are increasingly among those arrested
and prosecuted for low-level offenses in state court, 141 a trend
137 FEELEY, supra note 19, at 15; Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, supra note 133, at 1132–37;
Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1343–47, 1351.
138 This is true for all misdemeanor defendants whose convictions might lead to collateral
consequences, such as the loss of housing or other assistance. See generally Roberts, supra note
19.
139 King, supra note 19, at 23 (approximately eighty-five to ninety percent of the nine to
eleven million criminal cases filed each year in state court are misdemeanors); Natapoff, supra
note 19, at 1314–15, 1320–21 (citing 2008 data from the National Center for State Courts and
2009 data from the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to estimate ten million
misdemeanor prosecutions per year, four or five times larger than felony prosecutions).
140 In 2011, New York prosecuted 394,185 misdemeanors and 153,890 felonies. In 2010,
394,053 misdemeanors and 1154,007 felonies were prosecuted. See 2007–2011 Disposition of
Adult Arrests, New York State, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., http://criminal
justice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/index.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
141 See ACLU OF N. CAL., COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: THE HIGH PRICE OF POLICING
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sometimes exacerbated in locations where local law enforcement
interacts or shares overlapping duties with federal immigration officers
through enforcement programs like section 287(g) and CAP. 142
The misdemeanor system copes with this enormous volume
through rapid processing made possible by the fact that nearly every
defendant will plead guilty rather than exercise trial rights. 143 A study by
Human Rights Watch in 2010, for example, found that 99.6% of
misdemeanor convictions in New York City are guilty pleas. 144
IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES 16 (2011), available at https://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_
justice/police_practices/costs_and_consequences.pdf (summarizing Ryan Gabrielson’s 2010
report stating that in a number of California counties, police more frequently set up sobriety
checkpoints to screen traffic in or near Hispanic neighborhoods); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 97–109 (2010)
(arguing that although Latinos and people of color are not actually more likely to be guilty of
drug crimes and other offenses than whites, there are huge racial disparities in who gets
stopped, searched, and arrested); N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 2011: NYCLU
BRIEFING 2 (2012), available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/NYCLU_2011_Stopand-Frisk_Report.pdf (finding that in 2011, blacks and Latinos accounted for more than fifty
percent of police stops in almost every precinct in New York City, and that in thirty-three out
of seventy-six precincts, ninety percent of stops were people of color); Amanda Geller & Jeffrey
Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race and the New Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 593 (2010) (“Street stops are conducted predominantly in poor
neighborhoods with high concentrations of black and Hispanic residents, at levels that exceed
even what local disorder and crime conditions would predict, and marijuana arrests are
clustered in many of the same neighborhoods . . . .” (citations omitted)); Natapoff, supra note
19, at 1324–39.
142 See, e.g., EDGAR AGUILASOCHO ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL., IRVINE SCH. OF LAW, MISPLACED
PRIORITIES: THE FAILURE OF SECURE COMMUNITIES IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 16–18 (2012),
available at http://www.law.uci.edu/pdf/MisplacedPriorities_aguilasocho-rodwin-ashar.pdf
(noting increased racial profiling in policing following the implementation of the Secure
Communities program); TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN
INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE
CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 1 (2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policy
brief_irving_FINAL.pdf (“[I]mmediately after Irving, Texas law enforcement had 24-hour
access . . . to ICE in the local jail, discretionary arrests of Hispanics for petty offenses—
particularly minor traffic offenses—rose dramatically.”); Billy Ball, DOJ Ends Federal
Immigration Program in Alamance County, INDY WEEK (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.indy
week.com/indyweek/doj-ends-federal-immigration-program-in-alamance-county/Content?
oid=3157331 (reporting that following a Department of Justice (DOJ) report accusing
Alamance County, North Carolina deputies and Sheriff Terry Johnson of biased policing, ICE
terminated the section 287(g) program in the county); Kari Lydersen, Racial Profiling,
Republican Candidates, and Rights Violations: The Immigration Debate at Year’s End,
ALTERNET (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/story/153626/racial_profiling,_republican_
candidates,_and_rights_violations%3A_the_immigration_debate_at_year%27s_end (reporting
that Arizona’s section 287(g) program was revoked following a DOJ investigation finding that
Maricopa County Sheriff Arpaio engaged in pervasive racial profiling); Albor Ruiz, President
Obama, Please Don’t Expand Failed Immigration Program 287(g), N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(July 18, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/president-obama-don-expand-failedimmigration-program-287-g-article-1.400519 (describing the section 287(g) program as
“synonymous with racial profiling”).
143 FEELEY, supra note 19, at 28 (“Despite their differences of position, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges are said to have a common administrative interest in the rapid processing
of cases which plea bargaining facilitates.”).
144 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 3.
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Defendants throughout the country are afforded mere minutes, or even
seconds, in front of misdemeanor judges, a feat sometimes
accomplished through advising defendants of their rights and taking
guilty pleas en masse. 145
Not only do courts afford misdemeanor defendants little time, but
huge numbers also journey through the process without the assistance
of an attorney 146—a problem for all defendants and one that can mean
banishment for noncitizens. Although in Argersinger v. Hamlin the
Supreme Court extended an indigent defendant’s right to counsel to
misdemeanor prosecutions, 147 states are not constitutionally required to
appoint counsel where there is no possibility of incarceration.148
Unsurprisingly, many states and municipalities do not provide indigent
defense counsel in these circumstances. 149 Even where a criminal statute
provides for prison as a potential sanction, courts often forgo
appointing counsel if incarceration will not result in the particular
defendant’s case. 150 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) recently
held that the fact that states do not provide indigent defendants counsel
for minor offenses does not preclude use of those convictions for
immigration purposes. 151
Where incarceration might be imposed, misdemeanor defendants
nevertheless frequently plead guilty without the assistance of counsel. A
FEELEY, supra note 19, at 11; Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1328–29.
See, e.g., BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 14–17 (citing empirical research
indicating a significant percentage of unrepresented defendants in state misdemeanor court);
FEELEY, supra note 19, at 9 (noting that approximately fifty percent of 1640 defendants
observed in a Connecticut lower court over a period of several months proceeded without the
assistance of counsel); Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1328–29.
147 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 667 (2002) (holding that
courts cannot impose incarceration on the basis of a misdemeanor probation violation unless
the defendant had counsel in the underlying adjudication).
148 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). As Alice Clapman observes, at the time that
Scott v. Illinois was decided, “it was extremely rare for a noncitizen to be deported based on a
single non-jailable conviction.” Clapman, supra note 20, at 590.
149 See, e.g., CONN. GEN STAT. § 51-296(a) (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211D, § 2B (2012);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-10 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-40-6.1 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 5201(4)–(5), 5231 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-160 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-6102(a)(v), -104(a) (2012); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.2(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.11(b)(1); ME. R. CRIM. P.
44(a)(1); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 44(a)(2); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 44(B).
150 See, e.g., ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.2(b) (counsel need not be provided where “the indigent is
charged with a misdemeanor and the court has determined that under no circumstances will
incarceration be imposed as a part of the punishment if the indigent is found guilty”); Rules
Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey—Second Appendix to Part VII: Guidelines for
Determination of Consequence of Magnitude, N.J. COURTS, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/
rules/r7-2nd_appendix.htm (last updated Feb. 1, 2013) (stating that the judge is to consider,
inter alia, whether a sentence of imprisonment will be imposed before assigning counsel to an
indigent defendant).
151 See In re Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 850, 851–54 (B.I.A. 2012) (holding that a
municipal marijuana violation where the defendant was not afforded a right to counsel or
advised of potential immigration consequences counts as a conviction for immigration
purposes).
145
146
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number of reports have shown that courts across the country fail to
appoint an attorney for petty defendants even when legally required to
do so. 152 Often the judge, or the court clerk, fails to inform defendants of
their right to counsel. 153 Alternatively, defendants are told they must
negotiate directly with prosecutors, following which the defendants
almost invariably waive counsel and plead guilty. 154 Colorado goes so far
as to statutorily mandate that misdemeanor defendants speak directly
with prosecutors in order to come to a plea agreement. 155 As a result,
advocates report that only a small handful of misdemeanor defendants
in that state, many of whom are noncitizens, ever speak with an
attorney. 156
In forty states, numerous counties do not provide defendants with
an attorney at bail hearings, 157 in violation of Rothgerry v. Gillespie
County. 158 Bail hearings are often the most critical phase of petty
prosecutions, because most defendants who can’t make bail plead guilty.
In some jurisdictions, poor defendants languish in pretrial incarceration
See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST
EQUAL JUSTICE 22–26 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_
proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf; BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 15.
153 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 152, at 24–25; BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 15–16.
154 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 152, at 24–25 (discussing reports of prosecutors frequently
negotiating directly with defendants in Georgia and Texas); BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note
6, at 16–17 (discussing reports of prosecutors negotiating directly with defendants in
Tennessee, Texas, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Colorado); FEELEY, supra note 19, at 220
(describing the process in Connecticut misdemeanor court in which prosecutors ask
unrepresented defendants, “Do you want to get your own attorney, apply for a public defender,
or get your case over today?”); NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, A RACE TO THE BOTTOM:
SPEED & SAVINGS OVER DUE PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 15 (2008), available at
http://www.michigancampaignforjustice.org/docs/Michigan%20NLADA%20report.pdf
(reporting that in Michigan misdemeanor courts, defendants “are arraigned, pretrial
conferences are held, and, if a plea can be worked with the [defendants], sentences imposed
generally all in a single day without defense counsel present”).
155 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301(4) (2013).
156 BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 17 (“In practice, most misdemeanor defendants in
Colorado never see a public defender.”); Telephone Interview with Violeta Chapin, Assoc.
Clinical Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (July 26, 2012) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Chapin Interview] (explaining that there is virtually no representation for
misdemeanor defendants in Colorado besides the sixteen to twenty clients per year accepted by
her criminal/immigration defense clinic at the University of Colorado Law School and those
cases taken by a similar clinic at the University of Denver).
157 As of 2009, in ten states (Alabama, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas) no indigent defendants are
provided counsel at bail hearings. See Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation,
59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 396 (2011). In thirty more states, “a defendant’s chance for a lawyer’s
advocacy at the initial bail hearing depends on the county where the arrest occurred.” Id. at
400–10.
158 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) (“[A] criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial
officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the
start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.”).
152

FOR
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for months before seeing a prosecutor or judge, let alone defense
counsel. 159
Judges also coerce defendants to waive counsel in petty cases. 160
Judges tell defendants that if they plead guilty they will go home right
away, but if they want a defense attorney they’ll remain jailed for (at
least) a few more days, increasing pressure to plea. 161 This kind of
coercion is particularly effective with juvenile defendants. 162 Even where
judges issue general, pro forma advisals that criminal convictions may
carry immigration consequences, or offer defendants the option of
continuing the case to speak with an attorney, those who are subject to
pretrial detention rarely choose to delay if they can plead right away to a
disposition with a lenient criminal sanction. 163 Not yet knowing the
actual immigration consequences of seemingly minor charges, and
offered the opportunity to conclude the criminal case, misdemeanor
defendants plead in haste.
Of course, even when appointed, misdemeanor defenders may not
be able to competently advise noncitizens of immigration consequences.
As discussed in more detail below, the majority of public defenders who
represent misdemeanor defendants are overburdened, inexperienced,
and subjected to significant pressure from prosecutors and judges to
encourage rapid pleas. 164 Overburdened attorneys simply do not have
time to learn much about their clients’ personal circumstances and

159 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 152, at 22–26 (discussing common failures to provide counsel
in Mississippi, Georgia, Montana, Washington, California, and elsewhere).
160 See BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 15–17; FEELEY, supra note 19, at 220.
161 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 152, at 25; see also BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 15–
16 (reporting that judges often fail to caution misdemeanor defendants about proceeding
without counsel and merely ask “whether the defendant want[s] to dispose of the case
quickly”).
162 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 152, at 25 (citing numerous reports suggesting that judges
habitually tell juveniles to waive their right to counsel in delinquency proceedings). Although
adjudications of delinquency are not “convictions” for immigration purposes, courts have
approved their use to deny applicants for adjustment of status and other immigration relief on
discretionary grounds. See, e.g., Wallace v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 2006). See
generally Elizabeth M. Frankel, Detention and Deportation with Inadequate Due Process: The
Devastating Consequences of Juvenile Involvement with Law Enforcement for Immigrant Youth,
3 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 63, 85–93 (2011)
163 Chapin Interview, supra note 156 (observing this dynamic in Colorado misdemeanor
courts). For detailed recommendations on best practices for judges presiding over criminal
cases involving unrepresented defendants, see NIKKI REISCH & SARA ROSELL, IMMIGRANT DEF.
PROJECT & N.Y UNIV. SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS AFTER
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN UPHOLDING DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS TO ADVICE
ABOUT THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2011), available
at
http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/postpadillaFINALNov
2011.pdf.
164 BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 14, 33, 39; Bibas, supra note 124, at 2481 (arguing
that new defenders lack experience, skill, knowledge, and credibility with prosecutors and
judges).
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immigration situations. 165 Many mistakenly believe that most petty
offenses do not carry immigration consequences. Others may know
slightly better, but still will not recognize important distinctions
between types of convictions for purposes of triggering deportation or
qualifying for discretionary relief from removal. They may assume, for
example, that if a defendant already has a petty conviction for
trespassing, reckless driving, or simple marijuana possession, another
misdemeanor won’t make a difference. But a DUI with a suspended
license, a narcotics misdemeanor, or an additional simple marijuana
possession offense can put the defendant in a much worse immigration
situation. 166
B.

Little Hope of Negotiating Immigration-Safe Pleas
1.

Prosecutors and Categorical Charging

Noncitizens may well be charged and prosecuted for low-level
offenses irrespective of the merits of their arrests. 167 While undoubtedly
there is jurisdictional variation, prosecutors are more likely to
reflexively file charges in low-stakes cases, even on weak evidence. 168 In
petty cases, the police’s arrest paperwork tends to be skeletal and
conclusory, giving prosecutors little means to readily sort out the cases
that are less meritorious. 169 As Josh Bowers puts it, “[p]rosecutors can
proceed with almost everything, because all cases look good enough;
and they cannot determine what to cast aside, because no case looks all
that bad.” 170
See infra Part III.B.2.
Each of these could be a deportable offense. See, e.g., Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558
F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding BIA’s determination that respondent’s conviction for DUI
with a suspended license was a CIMT). Even if the noncitizen is already deportable because of
prior criminal history or immigration violations, the specifics of the additional conviction can
affect eligibility for discretionary relief. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing how variations between
similar convictions can make a critical difference in immigration outcomes).
167 In general, declination rates for felonies tend to be much higher than for misdemeanors.
See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 124.
168 See, e.g., Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 124, at 1700–03; Bowers, Punishing the Innocent,
supra note 133, at 1126–27; cf. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 63 fig. 9 (citing data that
NYC district attorneys declined to prosecute about twelve percent of misdemeanor arrests in
2011).
169 Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 124, at 1701–02; Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals,
Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1362
(“As long as the [police] report contains elements of a prima facie case . . . this
report . . . typically will be sufficient to meet the pretrial screening requirements imposed to
justify the detention and charging of the defendant.”); Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1328
(“Prosecutors fail to screen and instead charge arrestees based solely on allegations in police
reports.”).
170 Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 124, at 1702; see also Weinstein, supra note 2, at 1159
165
166
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When it comes to petty cases, prosecutors also have an interest in
expediently securing as many convictions as possible, even if the
punishment imposed is mild. 171 Unlike with felony charges, prosecutors
routinely offer misdemeanor defendants generic, cookie-cutter
dispositions that do not carry serious penalties under state law, with the
expectation of quick pleas. 172 Although prosecutors’ policies towards
misdemeanor dispositions fluctuate across and even within jurisdictions
over time, 173 it is evident that in the misdemeanor world actual
culpability is often presumed or irrelevant. 174
For the noncitizen defendant, however, nearly automatic plea-deals
that seem mild can result in deportation. To illustrate, consider the not
uncommon case in which police stop a driver for speeding and discover
what appears to be paraphernalia for smoking marijuana. Prosecutors in
these cases routinely charge both reckless driving and possession of drug
paraphernalia (PDP), and then offer a plea to the PDP charge with
probation or time-served. 175 For many defendants this may be a
beneficial bargain, because that charge won’t result in drivers license
points and they can return immediately to their lives. But for
noncitizens, the PDP offense qualifies as a deportable controlled
substance offense. 176 If the noncitizen doesn’t have counsel—and often
even if she does—she will neither learn that PDP carries immigration
consequences nor try to negotiate a better bargain. 177 If ICE has marked
the noncitizen with an immigration detainer, she may also be unaware
that the PDP plea will increase the amount of bond required to secure
release from inevitable immigration custody. 178 In fact, immigration
(arguing that it is “very difficult for our lower criminal courts to reliably sort minor cases
according to their merits”).
171 Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, supra note 133, at 1139–45; see also id. at 1135 n.77 (“As
an institutional matter, low-set bargain prices are the most efficient means to ensure that
unimportant cases plead quickly en masse, with minimal defendant hesitation.”).
172 Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 124, at 1702–05.
173 See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5 (demonstrating that though arrests for lowlevel offenses in NYC have exploded in recent years, misdemeanor prosecutions and
convictions have not increased proportionally).
174 See, e.g., Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 124, at 1707 (“Guilt is typically presumed in a
process too rough-and-ready for the parties to develop and consider it properly . . . .”);
Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1328–30, 1369–70.
175 Chapin Interview, supra note 156.
176 See Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a conviction for
possession of drug paraphernalia under Arizona law is an offense “relating to a controlled
substance” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000)).
177 Chapin Interview, supra note 156 (reporting that one Colorado prosecutor admitted that
he had “been offering PDP pleas to unrepresented misdemeanor defendants subject to ICE
holds for a long time”).
178 See generally AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN
THE USA 17–19 (2009), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf
(reporting that ICE field officers and immigration judges set higher bonds for noncitizens with
criminal histories).
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judges can order detention without bond based solely on pending
criminal charges, 179 and all controlled substance offenses render
respondents bond ineligible. 180
For many additional reasons, negotiation with prosecutors can be
difficult in minor cases. Prosecutors frequently work misdemeanor
dockets by shift and appear on cases about which they have little
knowledge or discretion. 181 Or, if they were the one to write up the case,
they most likely proceeded on the word of one police officer whose
information they had neither the incentive nor the time to question.
New prosecutors, cutting their teeth on misdemeanor cases, may need
permission from supervisors to deviate significantly from the original
charge. 182 They are also the “most deferential to supervisory authority
and are therefore least likely to buck policy by exercising case-specific
equitable discretion.” 183 New prosecutors may also be systematically
harsher. 184
On the other hand, veteran misdemeanor prosecutors, though
perhaps mellowed with time, may be dulled by the repetition of their
work. 185 For them, a new defendant is just “the usual man in the usual
place.” 186 Prosecutors’ caseloads are substantial and their days are full. 187
If they can avoid further work, especially in the petty cases about which
they care the least, they will. 188 Part-time prosecutors—comprising
179 See, e.g., In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40–41 (B.I.A. 2006) (upholding an immigration
judge’s decision to deny bond based on drug charges despite the fact that respondent had not
yet been convicted).
180 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) (2012).
181 Weinstein, supra note 2, at 1181 (“In the lower-level court in which I practice, the
prosecutors very rarely appear on their own cases. They read from a note in the file, have no
personal knowledge about the case in front of them and precious little discretion.”).
182 DAVIS, supra note 135, at 34 (assistant prosecutors who wish to deviate from office
charging policy may need to seek permission from a supervisor).
183 Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 124, at 1704 (citing MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA
BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 92–99
(1981)); see also 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION 4 (4th ed. 2006) (“Prosecutors’ offices . . . often have internal
guidelines governing such matters as charging decisions and plea bargains.”); Todd Lochner,
Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United States Attorneys’ Offices: The Role
of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271 (2002) (arguing that the prosecutorial
priorities of newer federal prosecutors are more aligned with office policy while veterans are
more willing to create their own prosecutorial agenda).
184 Bibas, supra note 124, at 2475.
185 FEELEY, supra note 19, at 4 (“Prosecutors, dulled by their repetitive work, may be
noncommunicative and appear to be vindictive.”).
186 Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 124, at 1689.
187 See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 270 (2011)
(“[P]rosecutors in many large counties handle far more cases than guidelines recommend.”);
Weinstein, supra note 2, at 1181 (“[P]rosecutors have to spend a good deal of their time in
court and have just a few hours at the start and end of the day to talk with witnesses, draft
papers, and carry out their other responsibilities.”).
188 HEUMANN, supra note 183, at 156–57; Bibas, supra note 124, at 2471 (“Prosecutors have
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roughly a quarter of the Nation’s prosecutors 189—may be even less likely
than their full-time counterparts to engage in protracted negotiations or
consider individual case dispositions outside the norm. 190
In sum, though particular district attorney’s offices and prosecutors
might be sympathetic to the outsized immigration consequences of a
minor offense in some cases, 191 the institutionalities that often govern
misdemeanor prosecutions present significant challenges for noncitizen
defendants seeking individualized equitable consideration of
immigration consequences. Categorical charging and fixed priced plea
deals are efficient ways of doing business, and prosecutors have little
reason to invest in the extra effort that would be required to give
misdemeanor cases particularized evaluation.
Given these factors, it comes as little surprise that immigrant
advocates report difficulties in persuading misdemeanor prosecutors to
take a close look at the equities of individual noncitizens’ cases, even in
jurisdictions with significant institutional awareness of the immigration
issues affecting defendants. Heidi Altman, who was previously in-house
immigration counsel at the Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem,
describes the “extraordinary efforts” sometimes required to convince
prosecutors to consider alternative pleas in minor cases. 192 Her account
of one LPR client’s experience is telling. In a case that would seem to
present strong equities—a gainfully employed family man with longtime
lawful immigration status and no prior criminal history, arrested for
personal incentives to reduce their workloads so that they can leave work early enough to dine
with their families”); Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, supra note 133, at 1140–41
(“[P]rosecutors also harbor the normatively more dubious motivation to avoid process and
work, where possible.”).
189 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private
Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 419 (2009).
190 FEELEY, supra note 19, at 75 (part-timers have a “strong incentive to rush through the
calendar in order to return to their full-time jobs”); James Eisenstein, Research on Rural
Criminal Justice: A Summary, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN RURAL AMERICA 105, 125 (Shanler D.
Cronk et al. eds., 1982) (explaining the “incentives for part-time prosecutors . . . to avoid timeconsuming proceedings”); Fairfax, supra note 189, at 442 (arguing that part-time prosecutors
“give short shrift to the criminal cases”).
191 See, e.g., Altman, supra note 118; Chin, supra note 17, at 1435 (“Accordingly, based on
negotiations with defense counsel, prosecutors regularly consider lesser charges, diversion, or
non-prosecution to allow relatively less serious offenders to avoid deportation, such as when
prosecutors granted a misdemeanor plea granted to the noncitizen mother of the famous
‘Balloon Boy.’” (footnote omitted)); Johnson, supra note 119. Altman’s survey of prosecutors in
the Kings County District Attorney’s Office under Charles Hynes (likely one of the more
progressive offices in the country), revealed that just over fifty percent of the 185 prosecutors
who responded believe pleas should sometimes be altered to mitigate negative immigration
consequences, though “less than half actually translate this belief into practice with any
frequency.” Altman, supra note 118, at 29. Just across the East River, the office of Manhattan
District Attorney Cyrus R. Vance, Jr. may be somewhat less sympathetic. See Cyrus R. Vance,
Jr., Collateral Consequences: Who Really Pays the Price for Criminal “Justice”?, 54 HOW. L.J.
539, 541 (2011).
192 Altman, supra note 118, at 3–7.
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smoking one marijuana cigarette while walking the dog—Altman relates
a process involving multiple, vigorous entreaties to the prosecutor and
her supervisor, supported by a flood of letters from family, friends and
employers, that ultimately secured an alternative plea to a disorderly
conduct violation. 193 The Bronx Defenders, an office renowned for its
holistic approach to criminal defense—with a cadre of in-house
immigration attorneys to advise defense counsel—likewise reports pleabargaining successes achieved for sympathetic noncitizen defendants
after significant advocacy and negotiations. 194 Anecdotal accounts
suggest that the immigration consequences of convictions are even less
salient influences on plea bargaining in other jurisdictions. 195
2.

Public Defenders’ Incentives to Plea Bargain Quickly

In the vast majority of petty prosecutions where counsel is
appointed, public defenders 196 meet their clients for the first time at
Id. at 3.
McGregor Smyth, formerly the managing attorney in the Civil Action Practice at the
Bronx Defenders, for example, relates that it took “[e]arly intervention and extensive
negotiation” to convince a prosecutor to allow an LPR arrested for visiting his children at the
family home (in violation of a family court order of protection for his wife) to plead to
trespassing violations. McGregor Smyth, “Collateral” No More: The Practical Imperative for
Holistic Defense in a Post-Padilla World . . . or, How to Achieve Consistently Better Results for
Clients, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 139, 151 (2011); see also Brooks Holland, Holistic
Advocacy: An Important but Limited Institutional Role, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 637,
651 (2006) (“In my experience [as a public defender in New York City], therefore, uncommon
is the case where a prosecutor or judge materially mitigates a disposition solely because of a
perceived collateral consequence, especially in more serious cases.”); Smyth, supra, at 151–52
(convincing a prosecutor to offer a misdemeanor plea with no jail time where a man
accidentally fired a gun into his neighbor’s home required “significant advocacy”). In a
telephone interview, Jennifer Friedman, an immigration attorney at the Bronx Defenders,
confirmed that negotiations for immigration-safe pleas can require substantial effort. See
Telephone Interview with Jennifer Friedman, Bronx Defenders Immigration Counsel, Bronx,
N.Y. (Aug. 3, 2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter Friedman Interview].
195 See, e.g., Altman, supra note 118, at 34 (noting that many prosecutors are unwilling to
modify the plea offers routinely extended to citizen defendants in cases where the defendant is a
noncitizen (citing Telephone Interview by Heidi Altman with Ann Benson, Immigration
Project Supervising Att’y, Wash. Defender Ass’n (Jan. 9, 2012); Telephone Interview by Heidi
Altman with Raha Jorjani, Supervising Att'y and Lecturer, Univ. of Cal. Davis Sch. of Law
Immigration Law Clinic (Jan. 2, 2012); and Telephone Interview by Heidi Altman with Manuel
Vargas, Senior Counsel, Immigrant Def. Project (Aug. 16, 2011))); Brown, supra note 113, at
1407 (“In sum, prospects are probably intermittent at best that state prosecutors will be actively
inclined toward crafting bargains that would reduce the odds of deportation, even in cases
where plausible plea bargain options exist for such a disposition.”); see also supra text
accompanying notes 175–177 (discussing an example of prosecutorial indifference to
categorical plea offers in minor cases that can result in immigration consequences for
noncitizen defendants).
196 Unless otherwise specified, my use of “public defender” includes county or statewide
public defender offices, organizations with contracts to provide indigent defense, and panel
attorneys assigned to indigent defendants.
193
194
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arraignments, confer briefly about the prosecutor’s offer, and then
resolve the case with a plea. 197 Throughout the country, underresourced
public defender offices tackle overwhelming caseloads. Although
national criminal justice standards recommend that defenders handle
no more than 400 misdemeanor cases per year, actual representation
numbers throughout the country far exceed that cap. Defenders in
Chicago, Atlanta, Miami, Dallas, Arizona, Tennessee, and Utah carry
misdemeanor caseloads numbering in the thousands. 198 Part-time
defenders in New Orleans may represent as many as 19,000
misdemeanor arrestees per year, limiting them to a mere seven minutes
per case. 199
If overburdened defenders in petty cases already lack the time to
adequately investigate and litigate defenses, 200 they will also find it
difficult to make the additional effort to carefully assess alternate
immigration-safe pleas or to discover and marshal client equities
sufficient to convince the prosecutor to deviate from her usual
categorical approach to plea negotiation. Determining whether a
particular plea offer will foreclose discretionary relief from removal, for
example, requires knowledge of both subtle variations in immigration
law and familiarity with the defendant’s individual circumstances.201
197 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 152, at 16 (“Witnesses recounted numerous examples
of representation so minimal that it amounted to no more than a hurried conversation with the
accused moments before entry of a guilty plea and sentencing.”); JUSTICE POLICY INST., SYSTEM
OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE 13 (2011), available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/system_overload_final.pdf (“In
many jurisdictions across the country defenders meet with their clients minutes before their
court appearance in courthouse hallways, often just presenting an offer for a plea bargain from
the prosecution without ever conducting an investigation into the facts of the case or the
individual circumstances of the client.”); Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the
Courts and the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 331 (2005) (“The high volume of pleas
at [misdemeanor] arraignments is especially alarming given that the defense lawyer has just
met the client and has not yet investigated and researched the facts and law of the case.”
(footnote omitted)).
198 BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 21.
199 Id.
200 See id. at 30–31 (“[A]cross the country[,] defenders do not have enough time to see their
clients or to prepare their cases adequately, there are no witness interviews or investigations,
they cannot do the legal research required or prepare appropriate motions, and their ability to
take cases to trial is compromised.”); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in
Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1081–82 (2006) (explaining that an
attorney with a large misdemeanor caseload “simply does not have the time or the resources to
investigate, prepare, or communicate adequately with the client so that the client can make an
informed decision and the attorney can advocate zealously for his client's best interests”); Bibas,
supra note 124, at 2479 (“In addition, overburdened defense attorneys cannot spend enough
time to dig up all possible defenses.”).
201 While Padilla’s rule applies on its face only to deportation consequences of convictions,
proportionality concerns are also raised when convictions foreclose paths to discretionary relief
or lawful return to the United States that would otherwise have been available. See infra text
accompanying notes 293–296. See generally Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the
Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 431–35 (2012) (arguing that bars to
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The noncitizen’s current immigration status, years of residence in the
United States, and family circumstances will all be highly relevant
factors. 202 For example, noncitizens who overstay a visa and have one
conviction for simple possession of marijuana might qualify for a waiver
of inadmissibility if they can show extreme hardship to a qualifying
family member, but two such offenses will bar such relief. 203 A single
misdemeanor conviction for sale of marijuana may eliminate all
discretionary relief for LPRs, whereas multiple counts of misdemeanor
possession might not. 204 Nor are the myriad distinctions among which
convictions will foreclose discretionary relief intuitive. 205 In fact, even
just determining whether a defendant is a U.S. citizen is not always
clear-cut. 206 And because of budgetary constraints, most public defender
offices simply do not have the resources to hire in-house immigration
attorneys to assist defenders in making these determinations.
Compounding the problem of excessive caseloads, misdemeanor
defenders typically have little experience. Petty prosecutions are viewed
as disposable cases that provide training to new hires (often just out of
law school). 207 New defenders are less skilled negotiators and have yet to
develop credibility with prosecutors and judges. 208 Defenders quickly
learn that good relationships with prosecutors may lead to better deals
for their clients. 209 While some clients will benefit from successfully
lawful reentry based on convictions or immigration violations also raise proportionality
concerns).
202 Clapman, supra note 20, at 610.
203 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (amended in parts not relevant to the analysis here by the
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat 54 (2013)).
204 Cancellation of removal is available to otherwise eligible LPRs with multiple marijuana
possession offenses so long as the convictions do not fall under the recidivist aggravated felony
category. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010); KRAMER, supra note 51, at
221–35, 373. Additionally, certain petty convictions will foul up the possibility of naturalization
for LPRs. See generally Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S.
Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J. 1571 (2012).
205 A firearms or domestic-violence offense, for example, won’t stop the clock for purposes
of accruing the seven-year residence requirement for LPR cancellation of removal, but a
controlled substance offense will. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B) (“For purposes of this
section, any period of continuous residence . . . shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien has
committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien
inadmissible to the United States . . . .”); KRAMER, supra note 51, at 370–71. As another
example, pleas to offenses involving pharmaceuticals may be safe, while offenses involving
narcotics will not be. Id. at 460.
206 See generally Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting
U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606 (2011) (discussing difficulties in
determining citizenship and the prevalence of detaining and deporting U.S. citizens).
207 BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 39 (“Many public defenders start in misdemeanor
courts after being hired right out of law school.”); Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 124, at 1709
(“In my former practice, public order cases went by the evocative title ‘disposables,’ because
that is what institutional actors intended for them.”); Stevens, supra note 206, at 2481, 2486
(explaining that new defenders may lack the experience to be good negotiators).
208 Bibas, supra note 124, at 2481, 2486.
209 Id. at 2475.
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forged relationships, this dynamic may also lead defense attorneys “to
represent their clients less vigorously.” 210 Judges, clerks, and prosecutors
pressure public defenders to be pliable in plea bargaining—those who
rock the boat too much may face future reprisals. 211
Another impediment to zealous misdemeanor representation is
that defenders are paid fixed salaries to represent large numbers of
indigent clients. 212 The problem is generally the same with appointed
counsel, who are paid fixed fees or low rates subject to caps. 213 An
Illinois state statute, for example, provides that assigned counsel are to
be paid only $150 per misdemeanor case. 214 Often there are little or no
additional funds for investigation or for hiring experts. 215 As Professor
Bibas observes, lawyers in high volume practices paid a small, fixed
salary, or a low per-case rate, have incentives to plead cases out as
quickly as possible. 216
Language and cultural barriers may also influence public
defenders’ choices (and results) in the plea-bargain process. More than
half of the foreign-born population is limited English proficient, 217 and
the supply of qualified interpreters lags far behind the demand. 218 The
Legal Services Corporation has recognized lawyering across language
differences as the most significant challenge faced by poverty lawyers
today. 219 Language and cultural differences complicate investigation of
defenses or mitigating circumstances, preparation of testimony or
equitable factors, and client counseling at all stages of representation. In

210 Albert W. Alschuler, Personal Failure, Institutional Failure, and the Sixth Amendment, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 149, 151 (1986).
211 Bibas, supra note 124, at 2480.
212 Id. at 2476. Compensation for misdemeanor defenders is woefully inadequate—around
$40,000 per year in some places. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 152, at 9–10; BORUCHOWITZ ET
AL., supra note 6, at 42–43.
213 Bibas, supra note 124, at 2476.
214 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 152, at 9 (reporting an attorney’s testimony at public hearings
conducted by the American Bar Association).
215 BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 38.
216 Bibas, supra note 124, at 2477.
217 Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 54
UCLA L. REV. 999 (2007) (discussing the massive increase of limited English proficient
immigrants among the clients served by poverty lawyers); Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to
Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, a
Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 551 (2009) (“Fifty-two percent of the foreign-born
population are limited English proficient.”).
218 Ahmad, supra note 217, at 1008; see also id. at 1031–61 (discussing the difficulties of
lawyering on behalf of limited English proficient clients both with and without interpreters).
219 LEGAL SERVS. CORP., GUIDANCE TO LSC PROGRAMS FOR SERVING CLIENT ELIGIBLE
INDIVIDUALS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY 1 (2004), available at http://lri.lsc.gov/sites/
default/files/LRI/pdf/04/Program_Letter_LEP_Guidance.pdf (“Among the many vast changes
that affect how and what services LSC programs provide to clients, none is more significant
than the high number of immigrants that have come to the United States over the past few
decades.”).
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short, an attorney who cannot communicate effectively with her client
will not be able to competently perform core lawyering tasks. 220
Additionally, defenders may believe (and it is sometimes true) that
their immigrant clients will be prejudiced by their inability to “speak the
language of the court.” 221 Cultural and language differences may also
reduce a defender’s patience or empathy for her client. 222 Challenges like
these decrease defense counsel’s ability to establish enough trust to have
an honest conversation with a client about his or her immigration
status. 223
In sum, rarely do misdemeanor defenders have the ability or
incentive to engage in the kind of zealous, outside-the-box lawyering
needed to overcome the entrenched norms governing misdemeanor
prosecutions in many jurisdictions. Ultimately, these challenges increase
the likelihood that defense counsel will encourage a quick plea, rather
than litigate the case to trial or engage in the investigation and effort
required to negotiate a plea that takes the client’s individual equities and
immigration situation into account. 224

Ahmad, supra note 217, at 1022.
See generally Ahmad, supra note 217, at 1001 (“Cases like these, in the health care system,
the criminal justice system, and the courts, have begun to draw public attention to the ways in
which inadequate attention to the country’s growing language diversity increasingly jeopardizes
life and liberty interests, particularly of poor people.”); Jason A. Cade, Narrative Preferences
and Administrative Due Process, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 155, 162–65, 169–85, 189 (2011)
(discussing how biases based on cultural and professional differences in narrative style can
influence adjudicators’ assessments of credibility and treatment of parties).
222 See, e.g., Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in ClientCentered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 377 (1997) (examining how unconscious
racism and cultural hegemony can affect the relationship between a lawyer and a client);
Kathlyn Mackovjak, Interviewing Immigrant Clients, in CULTURAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL
DEFENSE, 39, 41–48 (Linda Friedman Ramirez ed., 3d ed. 2010) (discussing how language and
cultural barriers complicate criminal representation of immigrant clients).
223 See Steven Zeidman, Padilla v. Kentucky: Sound and Fury, or Transformative Impact, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203, 223 (2011) (“As every text and article ever written about criminal
defense interviewing and counseling has observed, it generally takes time, thought, and
patience to develop a relationship of mutual trust and respect before a client is willing to tell
counsel of ‘negative’ or incriminating facts (for example, that he is here illegally).”).
224 Ahmad, supra note 217, at 1000–30 (discussing the lack of professional and ethical
standards guiding the representation of limited English proficient immigrants); Susan Bryant,
The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 47–48
(2001) (discussing how cultural differences can lead to wide disparities when evaluating the
merits of a particular plea bargain).
220
221
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Misdemeanor defendants who cannot make bail usually plead
guilty. 225 When bail is imposed as a condition of release, most
defendants charged with minor offenses do not have the funds to post
it. 226 Immigrants in particular tend to be low-wage earners. 227 In New
York City, for example, defendants overwhelmingly cannot make bail
even where the bond is set at $1000 or less. 228 Nevertheless, judges often
set the amount much higher than $1000. 229 Nationwide, about eightyfive percent of defendants (both felony and misdemeanor) cannot afford
bail. 230
Pretrial detention imposes substantial hardships on individuals and
their families. Overcrowded, violent, and unhealthy, pretrial jails often
boast conditions worse than prison (and in fact, a good forty percent of
jail inmates have already been convicted). 231 In addition to the punitive
225 See, e.g., BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 30–33 (reporting anecdotes from around
the country about bail and other pressures on misdemeanor defendants to plead guilty at the
earliest opportunity); ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS,
THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 15 (2011),
available at https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=20794&libID=20764
(concluding, based on a study of misdemeanor prosecutions in twenty-one Florida counties,
that the inability to make bail may be the “most significant predictor of defendants entering a
plea of guilty or no contest at arraignment.”).
226 NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, THE TRUTH ABOUT COMMERCIAL
BAIL BONDING IN AMERICA 8 (2009), available at http://www.napsa.org/publications/
napsafandp1.pdf (noting that nationwide, about eighty-five percent of all defendants cannot
afford bail); Bibas, supra note 124, at 2491–93.
227 See Ahmad, supra note 217, at 1011–12 (describing studies showing “correlations
between limited English proficiency of recent immigrants and poverty”); Markowitz, supra note
217, at 551 (citing the U.S. Census for the proposition that the foreign-born “are
disproportionately poor and . . . significantly more likely to be lacking in basic education”);
Michael S. Vastine, Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor . . . and Your Convicted? Teaching “Justice”
to Law Students by Defending Criminal Immigrants in Removal Proceedings, 10 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 341, 349 (2010) (“[A] look at the wealth disparity of most
first generation immigrants relative to the general population reveals a population more socioeconomically vulnerable to both heavy policing and poor legal representation.”).
228 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 1; see also Bowers, Punishing the Innocent,
supra note 133, at 1136 (“[I]n New York City in 2004, only ten percent of defendants held on
bail were able to buy release at arraignment . . . .”); Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1324 (“[Eighty]
percent of those arrested [in New York City for misdemeanor marijuana possession] are black
or Latino. For those required to post bail, the vast majority cannot pay . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
229 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 12–13 (reporting that in fifty-eight percent of
non-felony cases where bail was required as a condition of release in 2008, judges set the bail
amount at $1000 or more).
230 NAT’L ASSOC. OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, supra note 226.
231 Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1322–1323 (describing widespread violence and disease in
jails).
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conditions of jail, the inability to work while incarcerated cuts deep. 232
For poor families, even short-term cessation of income may result in
severe consequences, such as the loss of a home, apartment, or car, and
lasting health and emotional problems in children. 233
How often is a bail bond required in petty cases? Although the
traditional bail factors—flight risk and public safety—are virtually the
same everywhere, the prevalence of bail bonds appears to depend in part
on where the defendant is charged. New York City judges impose bail as
a condition of release in about twenty-five percent of non-felony cases
that survive arraignment. 234 In Baltimore, about fifty percent of nonfelony defendants must post bail to be released while awaiting further
proceedings in their case. 235 In Feeley’s study of a Connecticut lower
court, bail was required of forty-eight percent of arrestees. 236
Additionally, many jurisdictions now take a defendant’s
immigration status into account when setting (or denying) bail. 237 In
some states, immigration status is one factor to be considered in
evaluating a defendant’s flight risk. 238 Judges in these jurisdictions
typically consider alienage along with family and community ties,
property ownership, and similar factors. 239 Other states have legislated
presumptions that undocumented residents should be denied bail. 240 In
Missouri, for example, a defendant believed to lack lawful status can be
held until he can prove otherwise. 241 Alabama’s anti-immigrant
legislation pushed this trend even further, requiring courts setting bail
to make “a reasonable effort” to determine the noncitizen’s immigration
232 FEELEY, supra note 19, at 30 (explaining that the costs of lost wages and jobs outweigh the
cost of conviction for most misdemeanor defendants).
233 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 2, 23; JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note
197, at 18.
234 See Secret, supra note 3, at A27.
235 See, e.g., Douglas Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really
Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1719, 1732–33 (2002).
236 FEELEY, supra note 19, at 206.
237 See Chin, supra note 17, at 1423–26.
238 Id. at 1424 (citing to case law in California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, and Texas). Federal courts also have considered alienage as a factor in setting bail.
See, e.g., United States v. Salas-Urenas, 430 F. App’x 721, 723 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Miguel-Pascual, 608 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2009); United States v. Chavez-Rivas, 536 F.
Supp. 2d 962, 968–69 (E.D. Wis. 2008).
239 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-30(B)(4) (2012) (requiring the court to consider
whether the defendant’s legal status indicates flight risk). As of February 28, 2013, no cases have
cited this provision.
240 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120.1(A) (2012) (creating a presumption that no
condition, or combination of conditions, will reasonably assure appearance of a defendant who
has been identified as illegally in the United States by ICE and charged with one of several
crimes, including misdemeanor DWI); see also Chin, supra note 17, at 1423–24 (citing state
statutes in Missouri, Virginia, South Carolina, and Illinois).
241 MO. REV. STAT. § 544.470(2) (2012). As of February 28, 2013, no cases have cited this
statute.
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status. 242 If determined to be unlawfully present, the defendant is
categorically considered a flight risk, denied bail, and detained until the
prosecution is complete. 243 Although a federal judge granted a
preliminarily injunction halting portions of the Alabama law from going
into effect, most of which was upheld on appeal by the 11th Circuit, this
provision was not enjoined. 244 It is very difficult for noncitizens placed
under immigration detainers to obtain bail because detainers are often
considered evidence of flight risk. 245 In practice, detainers often increase
incarceration by weeks or even months. 246
If ineligible for release or unable to post the required bond,
defendants are jailed while awaiting further proceedings. More than half
of all detained defendants spend at least a month incarcerated while the
cases against them slowly proceed, and, for more than twenty-five
percent, pretrial incarceration lasts between two and six months. 247
Taking a case to trial (or winning a dismissal on speedy trial grounds)
will likely take six months or more in some jurisdictions, even for

242 H.B. 56 § 19(a), 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2011 Ala. Laws 535 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-1318 (2012)) (“[W]hen a person is charged with a crime for which bail is required, . . . a
reasonable effort shall be made to determine if the person is an alien unlawfully present in the
United States . . . .”).
243 Id.
244 See United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1293 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (granting
preliminary injunctions against certain provisions of H.B. 56, but not section 19), aff’d in part
rev’d in part, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at
340, United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (No. 5:11CV02484), 2011 WL 2654277; see
also United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (upholding most of the District Court’s
preliminary injunction but not considering section 19).
245 See AGUILASOCHO ET AL., supra note 142, at 3 (“[P]olice often refuse to accept bail from
people who have ICE detainers . . . .”); ANDREA GUTTIN, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., THE
CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 12
(2010), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Criminal_Alien_
Program_021710.pdf (“ICE-detainer inmates are unlikely to receive bail while awaiting trial.”);
AARTI SHAHANI, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, NEW YORK CITY ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION
DETAINERS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 4 (2010), available at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/
sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/NYC%20Detainer%20Report.pdf (“While New York has no
such de jure prohibition on bail for non-citizens, the immigration detainer acts as a de facto
one.”).
246 See SHAHANI, supra note 245, at 1 (“Controlling for race and offense level, noncitizens
with an ICE detainer spend 73 days longer in jail before being discharged, on average, than
those without an ICE detainer.”); Felisa Cardona, ACLU Sues Jeffco Sheriff over Lengthy ICE
Hold, DENVER POST (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_14932928. The
additional jail time stems from a number of factors, including ICE delays in following up,
difficulties obtaining bail from police or courts once placed under a hold, and the detainer’s
impediments to accessing alternative-to-incarceration programs. See AGUILASOCHO ET AL.,
supra note 142, at 3; GUTTIN, supra note 245, at 12–13; KOHLI ET AL., supra note 73, at 7.
247 Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1321 (citing DORIS J. JAMES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SPECIAL REPORT: PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES, 2002 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/pji02.pdf); see also Chapin Interview, supra note 156 (“Fighting a case all the
way to trial in Boulder means sitting in jail for at least two to three months.”).
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detained defendants. 248 As a result, the length of pretrial detention often
exceeds any punishment that the state might impose after conviction. 249
For most defendants, noncitizens included, the costs associated
with remaining incarcerated while fighting petty charges appear to
outweigh the cost of pleading guilty at the earliest opportunity. 250 The
prospect of both prohibitively high bail and lack of information
generally looms larger for noncitizens than other defendants. Moreover,
while it is true that those noncitizens who are accurately informed of the
immigration consequences may assess the process costs differently, the
ICE enforcement programs in jails provide a countervailing force,
powerfully inciting noncitizens to plea quickly, as I explain further in
Part III.C.
b.

Little Likelihood of Success

The defendant’s custody determination, among other factors, also
affects her ability to prevail at trial, which in turn influences pleabargaining leverage. Incarcerated defendants are more likely to be
convicted than those who remain free pending disposition.251 Detained
defendants will have difficulty meeting with their attorneys and tracking
down witnesses or other evidence for a defense. 252 They will also have
trouble marshaling letters of support, medical records, and other
equities sufficient to convince prosecutors that an alternative
immigration-safe plea is warranted. 253 If the noncitizen has retained
private counsel, his or her inability to work may impede payment of
legal fees—a problem that is exacerbated where cases drag on longer
than expected.

248 Friedman Interview, supra note 194 (explaining that misdemeanor defendants in the
Bronx often must remain in jail for at least six months if they do not want to plead guilty).
249 See, e.g., FEELEY, supra note 19, at 10 (presenting the results of an empirical study finding
that twice as many defendants in minor cases were incarcerated before trial as after conviction).
250 BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 32–33 (relating anecdotal accounts from attorneys
from New York, Phoenix, and Philadelphia about the pressure jailed defendants feel to plead
guilty); FEELEY, supra note 19.
251 Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for
Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 106
(2012) (“Thus, it is increasingly accepted that pretrial criminal detention—even with appointed
counsel—leads to more wrongful convictions.”); Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 984–85 (2007) (“One study found that defendants who are
incarcerated prior to trial are 35% more likely to be convicted than those who are not—if the
defendant is facing a felony charge, he is 70% more likely to be convicted if he is in jail before
trial . . . .” (citing Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The Eighth
Amendment’s Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 50 (2005))).
252 Bibas, supra note 124, at 2493; Lester, supra note 251, at 51 (arguing that a free defendant
can assist in finding witnesses and has fuller access to his or her attorney).
253 See generally Bibas, supra note 124, at 2491–93.
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Even when defendants are at liberty pre-trial, many obstacles
prevent them from winning their cases outright. As noted, defendants
may lack counsel or may be appointed public defenders who are
inexperienced or overwhelmed. Lack of competent counsel can be
meaningful, as misdemeanor defenses often require careful assessment
of legally relevant facts 254 or complicated constitutional issues. 255
Attorneys whose clients plead in every (or nearly every) case lack trial
experience, which also reduces their plea-bargaining leverage. High
volume misdemeanor representation makes pleas the norm, and when a
lawyer always plea bargains, trial is not a credible threat. 256 Prosecutors,
on the other hand, have well-documented conviction biases, decreasing
the likelihood that the case will be resolved short of trial unless the
defendant pleads to something. 257
Fighting charges usually involves lengthy delays and multiple court
appearances. 258 Even after suppression hearings and other pretrial
matters are concluded—a milestone that in busy jurisdictions can take
many months to reach—defendants often must continue to appear on
multiple occasions before finally receiving a bench trial. 259 Although
defendants may sometimes be able to win dismissals under speedy trial
rules, the many exceptions to the statutory limit mean that the rules do
not significantly constrain prosecutorial delay. 260 Many defendants
eventually succumb to fatigue or miss court appearances.
Finally, in the public order offenses that comprise the bread and
butter of misdemeanor prosecutions, the “evidence” of guilt most often
consists of the arresting officer’s testimony, which may be privileged

254 BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 12 (observing that careful assessment of the legally
important facts might make a difference in the outcome of a seemingly simple trespass case).
255 See Roberts, supra note 19, at 303 (“Like felonies, misdemeanor cases raise issues of
suppression in drug and weapons cases, expert testimony in drug, assault, and drunk driving
cases, and Crawford/Confrontation Clause issues in domestic violence and other types of
cases.” (footnotes omitted)). Public order offenses may raise free speech, overbreadth,
vagueness, or other constitutional concerns. Id. at 304.
256 Bibas, supra note 124, at 2478–79.
257 Id. at 2471–72; Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 124, at 1703 & n.224. The acceptable
range of dispositions in minor cases will obviously vary depending on the policies of the
individual prosecutor or her office, and may sometimes include non-criminal infractions or
adjournments in contemplation of dismissal, but the generalization that prosecutors tend to not
dismiss cases once charges have been filed is at this point widely accepted.
258 FEELEY, supra note 19, at 10 (“Cases in which there was no trial, no witnesses, no formal
motions, no pretrial involvement from the bench, and no presentence investigation still
required as many as eight or ten different appearances spread over six months.”); HEUMANN,
supra note 183, at 70–71 (1978) (defendants who wish to fight their cases must come “[b]ack
and back and back”); Weinstein, supra note 2, at 1172.
259 Id.
260 Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1140 (2005); Weinstein, supra note 2, at 1172 (“[W]ithout any delay by
the defense, it is very rare for a case to get to trial before the fifth court date.”).
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over a contrary account by the defendant. 261 Moreover, judges (there is
no right to a jury trial for “petty offenses”) 262 may informally adjust the
burden of proof in accordance with the severity of criminal
punishments. 263 Studies have suggested that adjudicators convict on less
evidence where defendants are charged with minor offenses or face less
severe criminal sanctions. 264 There is evidence that policy-makers are
aware that offenses with lesser sanctions make convictions easier to
obtain. As Professors Guttel and Teichman have observed, legislators at
times intentionally lower penalties, particularly with respect to drugrelated offenses, “not to weaken the punitive attitude toward marijuana
but rather to strengthen it by overcoming the hurdle of securing
convictions in the face of harsher punishment.” 265
261 See Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 29) (on file with author) (“A large percentage of
misdemeanor cases (such as drug cases or public order offenses) rest solely on the word of law
enforcement, making the likelihood of a cognitive bias in favor of the police in a ‘client said,
police said’ kind of case particularly high, even by defense counsel.”).
262 See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160
(1968).
263 See Ehud Guttel & Doron Teichman, Criminal Sanctions in the Defense of the Innocent,
110 MICH. L. REV. 597, 601–07 (2012) (reviewing the results of a number of empirical and
experimental studies as well as legislation and case law supporting the assertion that “the
evidentiary threshold for conviction is correlated with the size of criminal punishments”). Such
adjustment of the burden of proof is, of course, unconstitutional. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (affirming that all elements of an offense must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt).
264 Martha Myers, for example, studied data from a random sample of 201 jury trials and
concluded that juries were more willing to convict where the crime was less serious. Martha A.
Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781,
785, 793–94 (1979); see also FUSAKO TSUCHIMOTO & LIBOR DUSEK, RESPONSES TO MORE
SEVERE PUNISHMENT IN THE COURTROOM: EVIDENCE FROM TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING LAWS 3,
11, 18–19 (2011), available at http://www.coll.mpg.de/economix/2010/paper/dusek.pdf
(presenting the results of a study indicating that tough “truth-in-sentencing” laws decrease the
probability of a conviction by nine percent); James Anderoni, Criminal Deterrence in the
Reduced Form: A New Perspective on Ehrlich’s Seminal Study, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 476, 479–82
(1995) (demonstrating an inverse connection between level of punishment and conviction
rates). As Professors Guttel and Teichman note, there may be other possible explanations for
the results of these empirical studies. For example, defendants may spend more on their legal
defense when the sanctions are more severe. See Guttel & Teichman, supra note 263, at 602.
However, a number of controlled experimental studies also support the conclusion that judges
and mock jurors adjust the burden of proof in accordance with the severity of the offense. See
generally id. at 602–03 (describing a range of experimental studies). In one study, for example,
mock jurors interpreted the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to require only seventy-five
percent probability of guilt for petty larceny, in contrast to ninety-five percent for murder. Rita
James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the Bench, the Jury,
and the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 319, 328 (1971).
265 Guttel & Teichman, supra note 263, at 604 (quoting a state senator who promoted a bill
lowering the penalty for marijuana possession in Nebraska as saying, “With the 7 day penalty
for the possession of a nominal amount, the courts will rather promiscuously [sic] based on the
evidence, apply these penalties.” (alteration in original)); see also id. at 604–05 (citing to
statements by Maine legislators indicating concern that a “tougher [sex offender] bill would
make it harder to secure convictions, and would force prosecutors to make victims take the
stand in order to present more evidence to the court”).
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In short, choosing to litigate a petty charge may not significantly
increase plea-bargaining leverage. Whether legally innocent or not,
acquittal is a dim prospect for most misdemeanor defendants, especially
noncitizens.
C.

Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Immigration Detainers

Thus far in this Part, I have concentrated on features of the
misdemeanor system that are more or less common in many
jurisdictions throughout the country. Our close examination of how
these norms play out for noncitizens reveals the tremendous obstacles
they face in obtaining favorable outcomes for immigration purposes in
lower criminal courts. Defendants who lack competent counsel, or any
attorney at all, will not be aware of the immigration consequences of
guilty pleas to petty charges. Even when defendants have knowledgeable
counsel, effective plea bargains and acquittals are difficult to achieve. To
be sure, where noncitizens are made aware that the total sanction
includes deportation or other immigration consequences, the costbenefit calculation changes, increasing the likelihood that they would try
to fight their cases at trial whatever the odds of success. 266 But there is a
countervailing dynamic in the thousands of jurisdictions where ICE has
integrated immigration enforcement programs with local criminal
processes. The ICE programs exacerbate the process costs for
noncitizens and often quash what incentives they might otherwise have
to fight the criminal case.
Though local implementation of the enforcement programs varies,
in broad strokes there are essentially two scenarios that matter in
misdemeanor cases. The sections that follow consider the defendants’
plea-bargain incentives in each scenario. First, the enforcement
programs influence misdemeanor cases where potentially deportable
defendants are likely to encounter ICE further along in the criminal
process. Those who cannot make bail often must choose between any
plea that offers an end to detention (e.g., time-served, probation,
community service, or a diversionary program), and detection by ICE if
they delay to investigate or defend against the charges. In the second
scenario, in which the defendant comes to arraignments already subject
to an immigration detainer, paying the criminal bond and even
prevailing in criminal court will seem futile without a clear path to legal
266 Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1411
(2005) (arguing that where defendants know they face immigration consequences as the result
of a conviction they are more likely to take the case to trial); Weinstein, supra note 2, at 1177
(“[S]o long as the cost of the proceeding is greater than the ultimate sanction, most cases will
never be litigated.”).
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status. For these defendants, already identified as deportable, fighting
the criminal case just adds to the cost and length of proceedings that will
eventually result in removal from the United States.
1.

Defendants Not Yet Subject to Detainers

The bail determination is critical for noncitizens not yet under an
immigration detainer but potentially subject to one. For noncitizens
with lawful status who are charged with deportable offenses, as well as
those who are already deportable because of civil immigration
violations, failure to make bail may lead to removal proceedings, or at
the least, prolonged state detention. As described above, many
defendants who are eligible for bail for relatively minor offenses
nevertheless do not have enough money to post the bond. 267 Oftentimes
state legislatures or individual judges elevate bond amounts for
noncitizens, or deny bail altogether. 268
In jurisdictions where immigration enforcement programs give
ICE agents access to jail, the specter of pretrial detention tends to
pressure defendants who cannot post bail to take quick pleas to lenient
criminal sanctions, even where they might be able to prevail at trial or
negotiate an alternative deal by holding out. Though the conviction may
raise the specter of additional immigration consequences, misdemeanor
defendants gamble that avoiding ICE in jail may allow them to
permanently escape detection by immigration authorities. 269 For many
foreign-born defendants, then, avoiding exposure to ICE in jail eclipses
all other concerns. 270
The defendant’s attorney, if appointed, often has only minutes at
the bail hearing to evaluate the defendant’s immigration situation, the
chances of success in both criminal and immigration proceedings, and
the likely amount of the immigration bond. 271 At this point in the
See infra Part III.B.3.
See infra Part III.B.3.
269 The federal government does not have the resources to apprehend even ten percent of the
many millions of noncitizens living in this country who are deportable because of civil
immigration violations or past convictions. See Motomura, supra note 109, 1829–33.
270 Telephone Interview with Jocelyn Simonson, Supervising Attorney, Bronx Defenders
(Feb. 4, 2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter Simonson Interview] (“For many noncitizens,
staying out of Rikers Island, [where ICE screens for deportable arrestees,] is the number one
priority.”); see also infra notes 277–283 and accompanying text (discussing criminal court cases
from New York City that shed some light on the influence of the ICE programs on plea
bargaining). A few jurisdictions, New York City included, have recently taken steps to
minimize the influence of detainers in certain circumstances. See infra Part V.
271 THE SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 1, at 143 (“[L]arge percentages of misdemeanor,
violation and infraction cases plead out at arraignment, often times after a lawyer has met with
his or her client for only a couple minutes. . . . During these few minutes, attorneys are expected
to assess whether to recommend the defendant plead or not, consult with the defendant and
267
268
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proceedings, counsel will have very little information about the strength
of the prosecutor’s case. Moreover, even experienced counsel will be
challenged to accurately assess the potential immigration consequences
in a single, brief meeting with a new client, let alone negotiate an
alternative plea bargain with the prosecutor. Given the time pressure
and risk, defendants offered an opportunity to walk out the courthouse
door at arraignments are incentivized to make what appears to be the
best of a bad situation and plead guilty, even to dispositions with
negative immigration consequences and even if they are innocent. 272
Because cognitive biases can play such a powerful role in
evaluation of a plea, one can understand why noncitizens are willing to
plea quickly to convictions that may have devastating future
consequences, and that they might be able to avoid with effort and time,
in exchange for certain (if tenuous) freedom now. 273 Most people are
more willing to gamble future losses than immediate ones. 274 For
deportable noncitizens, any outcome short of actual removal may be
presented or perceived as a gain and therefore a good deal.
Although the incentives at work are clear, data documenting the
frequency that noncitizens plead to avoid contact with ICE is admittedly
difficult to come by. In general, attorneys are understandably cautious
about revealing whether and how often they advise innocent clients to
strategically plead guilty. 275 Nevertheless, a prominent practice manual
guiding noncitizen representation in criminal proceedings recommends
that “[w]here defendant is undocumented and does not yet have an ICE
detainer,” defense counsel should “employ whatever strategies are
available if avoiding ICE apprehension is defendant’s highest
priority.”276
A number of decisions evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel
claims reveal that some noncitizens do take pleas motivated by avoiding
ICE detection. In People v. Cristache, for example, a New York City
fully advise him or her of the consequences that come along with having a criminal
conviction . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
272 Simonson Interview, supra note 270.
273 See Bibas, supra note 124, at 2513–15 (discussing how gain-framing affects pleanegotiations); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Political Economy of Prosecutorial Indiscretion, in
CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 533, 534 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2011) (arguing that
most defendants undervalue future harms).
274 Bibas, supra note 124, at 2504, 2505 & n.172 (observing that defendants often discount
future costs when plea bargaining, valuing “a day of freedom today . . . more than a day of
freedom ten years from now”).
275 For a thoughtful discussion of the debate among judges, advocates, and academics about
the ethics of facilitating guilty pleas of innocent persons, see Bowers, Punishing the Innocent,
supra note 133.
276 NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRANT DETAINERS: AN OVERVIEW
FOR STATE DEFENSE COUNSEL 21 (2011), available at http://www.nationalimmigration
project.org/legalresources/practice_advisories/pa_Understanding_Immigration_Detainers_052011.pdf.
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Criminal Court judge found that a lawful permanent resident had not
received ineffective assistance where his counsel advised him to plead
guilty rather than proceed to trial on removable offenses. 277 The court
noted that the defendant’s attorney negotiated a disposition that
“conditionally guaranteed that defendant would have remained ‘out of
jail’—i.e., Rikers Island—where ICE agents routinely engage in a
concerted effort to identify criminal aliens for deportation.” 278 The court
observed that “the risk of removal (or the risk of detection for removal)
may be reduced where a noncitizen is able to remain out of jail, as the
plea negotiated by plea counsel anticipated.”279 The court praised
defense counsel’s “holistic approach,” concluding that the attorney’s
strategy “effectively placed defendant in the best position to avoid actual
deportation.” 280
Similarly, in People v. Bevans, the court found that defense counsel
reasonably negotiated a plea to Disorderly Conduct with release for
time-served, in part because it minimized the possibility of detection by
ICE. 281 The court noted, “ICE routinely monitors the Corrections
Department in a concerted effort to identify criminal alien Defendants
subject to deportation removal proceedings,” and, consequently, the
“risk of removal for a criminal defendant alien is reduced when such
alien is able to secure a release from jail.” 282 Other recent trial court
decisions also cast light on the pressure that ICE access to pretrial
detention places on plea bargains. 283
It is worth noting that noncitizens’ desperate strategies for avoiding
ICE detection do not always work, however, even in the relative short
term. Frequently, for example, defendants in minor cases must agree to
277
278
279
280
281

2011).

907 N.Y.S.2d 833, 847 (Crim. Ct. 2010).
Id. at 846.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 845–46.
926 N.Y.S.2d 345, No. 20704V-2008, 2011 WL 923077, at *14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 31,

282 Id. at *14; see also id. at *9 (noting that the district attorney’s office’s opposition to
defendant’s motion to reopen argued that the defendant was not prejudiced by a guilty plea that
allowed him to avoid detection by ICE in pretrial detention).
283 See, e.g., People v. Santana, No. 05420/1997, 2012 WL 2377788, at *9 n.14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
June 19, 2012) (“Indeed, the fact that Defendant received a sentence of probation may have
benefitted him in the immigration context in that incarcerated inmates may be more likely than
non-incarcerated persons to be targeted by U.S. Immigrations and Enforcement Agency [sic]
for deportation.”); People v. Noriega, No. SCI 1776/92, 2012 WL 954270, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 19, 2012) (“Incarceration increases a defendant’s chances of being deported since ICE
specifically targets incarcerated individuals. Rather than being prejudiced by his non-jail
disposition in 1992, defendant, himself, actually lessened his chances of being deported by
accepting the plea offer.” (citation omitted)); People v. Quing Lin Zeng, No. 2010CN006198,
2011 WL 5041792, at *1–2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Oct. 21, 2011) (holding that the defendant, arrested
for selling subway card swipes, had not been prejudiced by accepting defense attorney’s advice
to plea to a non-jail disposition because doing so avoided contact with ICE and “actually
lessened his chances of being deported”).
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probation to avoid jail time. ICE has occasionally relied on local
probation and parole officers to facilitate the arrest of noncitizens with
criminal records. 284 It is unclear whether this risk of later detection has
any effect on the plea incentives (and cognitive biases) for noncitizens
charged with misdemeanors but not yet subject to detainers.
2.

Defendants Already Subject to Detainers

Certain noncitizens arrested in a Secure Communities jurisdiction
typically will already be tagged with immigration detainers by the time
of their first court appearance. At booking, local police officers send an
arrestee’s biometrics to the FBI to check for warrants. As noted
previously, all biometrics from Secure Communities jurisdictions are
forwarded to DHS, where they will be run through databases that
identify previous immigration violators, immigrants with deportable
convictions, and visa overstays. If the system indicates the person might
be deportable, an officer at ICE’s Law Enforcement Support Center
(LESC) then issues a detainer or contacts a local ICE field office. 285
As discussed above, many judges take immigration status into
account when assessing flight risk, and many judges consider an
immigration detainer to be a signal of flight risk, 286 however
erroneous. 287 Even if the judge sets a criminal bond, defendants who can
284 See, e.g., DET. WATCH NETWORK, supra note 84, at 11, 17, 22 (reporting collaborations
between ICE and state probation officers, including a May 2004 incident in New York in which
probation officers lured 138 parolees to non-routine appointments where they were arrested
and detained by ICE, though none had violated parole requirements); N. MANHATTAN
COALITION FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, DEPORTADO, DOMINICANO, Y HUMANO: THE REALITIES
OF DOMINICAN DEPORTATIONS AND RELATED POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 18–19
(2009), available at http://www.nmcir.org/Deportado%20Dominicano%20y%20Humano.pdf
(describing an incident in which ICE, acting on intelligence from a parole officer, raided at
daybreak the home of a man paroled for a minor drug offense and detained him); Appendix,
Partners in Justice Colloquium Transcript, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 739, 802 (2006)
(recounting a statement by an unidentified New York Criminal Court judge that even if judges
recommend probation or order a probation report for noncitizens, probation officers
sometimes report the defendant to ICE).
285 Corrections officials in locations that are not yet Secure Communities operational can
still contact ICE about suspected deportable immigrants. See ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra
note 68; Chapin Interview, supra note 156 (reporting this happens frequently in Boulder,
Colorado, which as of the time of my interview with her was not a Secure Communities
jurisdiction).
286 See, e.g., State v. Fajardo-Santos, 973 A.2d 933, 934–35 (N.J. 2009) (upholding judge’s
decision to triple the bond amount solely because ICE had issued a detainer).
287 Although immigration officers must have a “reason to believe” that the arrestee is a
noncitizen, the applicable statute and regulations do not provide an evidentiary standard. Nor
is the issuance of detainers limited to those who are actually removable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)
(2012). Errors are common, and one study of the Secure Communities Program concluded that
approximately 1.6% (3600) of the people detained under the program in 2011 were U.S.
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make bail won’t be free while the case is pending. Rather, ICE will
assume custody and the defendant will then have to pay an additional
immigration bond. Immigration judges are authorized to set bonds as
low as $1500 but frequently do not. 288 In some jurisdictions immigration
bonds average around $10,000. 289 If the noncitizen is charged with a
misdemeanor that might be construed as an aggravated felony or drug
ground of removal, he or she will be subject to mandatory detention.290
A competent defender representing a noncitizen with an immigration
detainer must assess not just the criminal case, but also the possibility of
immigration relief and the likely amount of the immigration bond (or
alternatively, whether mandatory detention will be triggered).
When an immigration-neutral plea is not on the table, defendants
with immigration detainers are in a tough situation. 291 Those without
any immigration relief will almost always plead guilty, even if they
might have strong defenses or are innocent of the crime, because
fighting the criminal case only increases and prolongs the costs and
hardships. Even an acquittal cannot prevent the sanction that
defendants care most about—banishment—which, especially in
misdemeanor cases, will far outweigh the potential penal sanction.
To illustrate, consider the predicament faced by Carlos, an
undocumented client of Violeta Chapin’s misdemeanor defense clinic at
the University of Colorado Law School. 292 Carlos walked into Whole
Foods to use the restroom. After leaving the store, he claimed to have
picked up a bag of chips from the sidewalk just outside the doors and
began to eat from it before being arrested and charged with shoplifting.
Although the clinic felt Carlos had a strong case against the theft charge
citizens. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 73, at 4; see also Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government
Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 607–12, 621–29
(2011) (analyzing data collected by the Florence Project suggesting that up to one percent of
“noncitizens” detained by ICE in southern Arizona between 2006 and 2008 were actually
citizens).
288 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 178, at 17 (reporting that judges across the country rarely set
bonds as low as the minimum of $1500, and the national average is $6000); N.Y. IMMIGRANT
REPRESENTATION STUDY, ACCESSING JUSTICE: THE AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL
IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 13 (2011), available at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/
content/denovo/NYIRS_Report.pdf (reporting that judges in New York set immigration bonds
at an average of $10,000, despite being authorized to release many individuals on their own
recognizance or to set bail as low as $1500).
289 N.Y. IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY, supra note 288, at 13; see also N.Y.
IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY, FINAL REPORT—STATISTICAL TABLES, tbl.19, available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/reports/FinalReport-NYIR-LOP_TO32-SecD.pdf (2011) (showing
that even in attorney-represented bond redetermination cases, most immigration bonds in New
York are set at $10,000 or more and can be as high as $50,000).
290 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A).
291 If the prosecutor offers an immigration-neutral plea, the defendant has less to lose by
pleading as quickly as possible and focusing on the immigration case. However, any criminal
history may affect discretionary relief.
292 Chapin Interview, supra note 156. “Carlos” is not the client’s real name.
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(he had no prior record and his criminal bond was set at an attainable
$300), he had been placed under an immigration hold at booking. The
likely immigration bond would have been $3000 to $5000, and lacking
ten years of continuous presence in the U.S. there appeared to be no
relief from deportation. In the end, despite his innocence, Carlos
decided the criminal charges weren’t worth fighting, since further
detention and deportation were inevitable. He took the prosecutor’s
offer of time-served with no probation to the theft-offense and was
deported not long after.
These minor convictions may well foreclose the possibility of
deportation relief or future immigration benefits. 293 In Carlos’ case, for
example, the theft offense conviction virtually guarantees that he will
never be able to lawfully return to the United States. 294 Others with
misdemeanor convictions might become ineligible for the significant
immigration benefits our country regularly extends based on natural
disasters or significant political strife in the noncitizen’s country of
origin. 295 Still others with minor convictions will find ICE prosecutors
unwilling to consider softer, discretionary forms of relief from removal
such as administrative closure. 296 Typically only those defendants whose
cases are thoroughly investigated by counsel with knowledge of
immigration law will be aware that they are in a category that provides a
path to lawful status (even if only temporarily), or that their other
equities would make them good candidates for prosecutorial discretion
in immigration proceedings. All of this takes time to assess, and, in
addition to the institutional impediments detailed above, counsel may
have difficulty convincing the client that it is worth waiting in jail
pending investigation.

293 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing how minor convictions can foreclose possible waivers
and paths to legal immigration status for unauthorized or otherwise deportable noncitizens).
294 A shoplifting conviction is a CIMT, even without jail time, thereby making Carlos
inadmissible and, because the offense occurred after October 8, 1998, subject to mandatory
detention if attempting reentry. See KRAMER, supra note 51, at 204–06, 300–03 (discussing case
law establishing that shoplifting is a CIMT and the consequences of CIMT convictions).
295 See 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (describing requirements for Temporary Protected Status); id.
§ 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i) (providing that noncitizens are ineligible for Temporary Protected Status if
convicted of two misdemeanors).
296 For example, noncitizen youth with three or more misdemeanors or a single “significant”
misdemeanor also become ineligible for an immigration prosecutorial discretion program
implemented by the Obama Administration in 2012 to benefit certain undocumented young
people, and agency guidance makes clear that officers can consider any criminal history as a
matter of discretion. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 61.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND IMMIGRATION POLICY
Perhaps the most glaring implication of the above analysis is that
defendants are unlikely to be able to plea bargain effectively for
immigration-safe outcomes in the very cases where deportation is most
disproportionate to the underlying conduct. In Padilla, the Supreme
Court assumed that noncitizens could to negotiate whether deportation
was a proportional outcome in the underlying criminal cases. But the
reality is more discouraging. In combination, the lack of attention from
counsel and prosecutors, detention and other process costs, and
likelihood of contact with ICE produce a system unreceptive to the kind
of negotiated, individualized assessment of the equities imagined by the
Padilla Court. 297
The structural impediments to effective plea bargaining in
misdemeanor court also have implications for the integrity of both
criminal justice and immigration law. Most critically, the convergence
of immigration enforcement with misdemeanor prosecutions elevates
the risk of both unwarranted convictions and unjustified deportations,
especially where immigration enforcement programs incentivize choices
unrelated to (and even at odds with) evidence or culpability. These
implications add critical components to emergent critiques of both
misdemeanor and deportation systems, and should inform law reform
efforts to ameliorate the pathologies of both systems.
A.

Elevated Risk of Noncitizens Pleading Guilty in Unwarranted Cases

A growing body of scholarship contends that the misdemeanor
system regularly produces unwarranted convictions. 298 Professor
Natapoff has levied perhaps the most sustained indictment. She argues
that the bread and butter of misdemeanor prosecutions, which follow
high volume arrests pursuant to policing strategies like ordermaintenance and zero-tolerance—sometimes called “broken windows”
policing—regularly produce convictions that are “evidentiarily
suspect.” 299 Once the machinery of the misdemeanor system begins,
with its indifference to guilt, lack of counsel, pretrial detention, repeated
court appearances, mass processing, and so on, defendants have
significant incentive to plead guilty to lenient penalties. Inevitably, some

297 See also Zeidman, supra note 223, at 210–11 (“No matter how well-intentioned and
Padilla-inspired an attorney may be, if she is representing close to 1000 people in a year, she
either cannot follow the dictates of Padilla, or will at most pay lip service to its holding.”).
298 See, e.g., King, supra note 19; Natapoff, supra note 19; Weinstein, supra note 2.
299 Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1335.
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unquantifiable (but non-negligible) percentage of those prosecuted and
convicted in this way are innocent. 300
Misdemeanor convictions against noncitizens are of even more
questionable integrity. As discussed above, poverty and detention cut
noncitizens off from support networks, potential witnesses, and income
that may be critical for their legal defense and family’s survival.
Language and cultural barriers diminish their ability to negotiate, appeal
to empathy, or navigate a successful defense. Noncitizens typically lack
knowledge or resources to hold shirking defense lawyers accountable.
They may think (and not without justification), that their “outsider”
status stacks the criminal justice system against them.
Most critically, potentially deportable noncitizen defendants in
petty cases make decisions of great consequence motivated primarily by
ICE’s access to jails. 301 Defendants facing detention must rapidly
evaluate whether to take a plea despite significant information deficits
or, by delaying, risk ICE contact. The time-pressure increases the
likelihood that the plea will not account for the strength of the
prosecutor’s case or the noncitizen defendant’s prospects for relief from
deportation. At bottom, the ICE enforcement initiatives magnify the
danger that fear or ignorance will skew innocent defendants’
bargaining—one of the most troubling injustices of the plea-bargaining
process. 302 For noncitizens, plea bargaining often happens in the shadow
not of trial, but of immigration detainers. 303 This influence almost
certainly produces unjustified convictions on a regular basis.
In theory, noncitizens, especially those with the possibility of
retaining or obtaining lawful status, have more incentive to fight charges
(or drive harder bargains) than most misdemeanor arrestees. But if they
do not have accurate knowledge about how the potential conviction will
affect their immigration status, and most will not, six months of
repeated court appearances, possibly while detained, will not seem
worth the candle. And as noted, even informed noncitizens may
perceive little value in contesting charges and prolonging
proceedings. 304 The convergence of federal immigration enforcement
programs with state criminal justice systems thus works to quash any
added incentives to fight minor charges. Instead, many noncitizens will
plea rashly even if the arrest was unlawful, the evidence is weak, or they
are innocent of the charge.

Id. at 1337.
See supra Part III.C.
302 Bibas, supra note 124, at 2494–95.
303 Cf. id. at 2468 (“Plea bargaining, then, often happens in the shadow not of trial but of bail
decisions.”).
304 See supra Part III.B.3.
300
301
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Relatedly, the integration of immigration enforcement programs
may have implications for the quality of representation that noncitizens
in misdemeanor court receive. Communication with noncitizen clients
may be difficult, and the collateral immigration issues complicate
representation. 305 If it is consistent with effective assistance of counsel to
encourage pleas that reduce the possibility of immediate, actual
removal, the ICE programs give defense attorneys (and perhaps
prosecutors) who would prefer to dispose of cases quickly a powerful
tool to encourage clients to plead, and there is less likelihood of
accountability in the event of sub-par representation. 306 While
presumptively deportable noncitizen defendants prioritize avoiding
apprehension by ICE, the guilty pleas that allow them to exit the system
may unnecessarily trigger other collateral consequences 307 and lead to
additional immigration consequences down the line. 308
To be sure, there is no evidence that all or even most noncitizen
misdemeanants are factually innocent. But the combination of a lack of
post-arrest prosecutorial screening and the intense pressures to plead
mean that noncitizens can easily end up with convictions even where
they are not guilty of the particular offenses charged, or where they were
racially profiled or unlawfully searched. Insofar as guilty pleas result
from pressures unrelated to evidence and guilt, they are indefensible as a
matter of criminal justice. For the deontologist, who advocates that
criminal sanctions should be based on retribution and just desert, 309
punishing those who may be innocent is morally impermissible. 310 From
a retributivist perspective, the pathologies of misdemeanor court are
arguably most problematic for noncitizens because they tend to be more
frequently subject to disproportionate penalties imposed on the basis of
the unjustified minor convictions than are citizens. 311 For the
consequentialist, who prioritizes minimizing the social costs of crime,
punishing defendants who have in fact observed the penal law
305 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing how language and cultural barriers can complicate
representation of immigrant clients).
306 See supra notes 277–283 and accompanying text (discussing New York State cases
finding counsel provided effective assistance where their clients took pleas that kept them out
of pretrial detention and thereby avoided detection and actual deportation).
307 See, e.g., Joy Radice, Administering Justice: Removing Statutory Barriers to Reentry, 83 U.
COLO. L. REV. 715, 717 (2012); Roberts, supra note 19, at 298–302.
308 See infra notes 331–337 and accompanying text.
309 Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 19, 22–26 (2003).
310 See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something that Feels So Good Be
Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451 (1990) (reviewing JEFFRIES G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988)) (“[J]ust deserts is a necessary condition of punishment.”).
311 This will not always be the case, of course, as losing eligibility for public housing,
termination of parental status, loss of professional licenses, and inability to gain employment
can also be highly disproportional consequences that can follow minor convictions. See
Roberts, supra note 19, at 298–302.
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undermines incentives to comply with legal rules. 312 Indeed, as
increasing numbers of misdemeanor defendants (noncitizen or
otherwise) plead guilty for reasons other than individual culpability, the
petty prosecution system’s legitimacy erodes. 313
B.

Elevated Risk of Unchecked Rights Violations and Jurisdictional
Disparities In Criminal and Immigration Enforcement

Modern policing strategies tend to result in disproportionate
arrests of people of color, particularly blacks and Latinos. 314 The
immigration enforcement programs magnify the already prevalent risk
of rights violations in petty offense arrests due to racial profiling. A
number of recent reports suggest correlations between racial profiling
and the ICE initiatives that give state and local officers a role in federal
immigration enforcement. 315 Immigrants may thus be particularly likely
to have been arrested for illegitimate reasons.
As a result of the institutional culture of district attorney’s offices
in many jurisdictions, even noncitizen defendants who have been
racially profiled, or arrested for minor offenses on less than probable
cause, will likely face charges. But the distorting effect that the
immigration enforcement programs can have on plea incentives in lowlevel prosecutions suggests that noncitizens will be deterred from
challenging unconstitutional policing even in egregious cases. This has
implications for society more broadly, because the ability of individuals
to assert their rights is critical for reforming unlawful arrest practices.
312 See Guttel & Teichman, supra note 263, at 608–09 (discussing the consequentialist theory
of punishment and explaining that “[f]rom a consequentialist approach, penalizing the
innocent undercuts the goal of minimizing the social costs of crime”); Louis Kaplow, The Value
of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 348–52 (1994)
(demonstrating that penalizing innocent defendants undermines deterrence goals of
punishment).
313 See Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1319 (“Because the misdemeanor world is so large, its
cultural disregard for evidence and innocence has pervasive ripple effects, not the least of which
is the cynical lesson in civics that it teaches millions of Americans every year.”).
314 See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
315 See, e.g., AGUILASOCHO ET AL., supra note 246, at 16–18 (noting increased racial profiling
in policing following the implementation of the Secure Communities program); GARDNER II &
KOHLI, supra note 142, at 1 (“[I]mmediately after Irving, Texas law enforcement had 24-hour
access . . . to ICE in the local jail, discretionary arrests of Hispanics for petty offenses—
particularly minor traffic offenses—rose dramatically.”); Ball, supra note 142 (reporting that
following a DOJ report accusing Alamance County, North Carolina deputies and Sheriff Terry
Johnson of biased policing, ICE terminated the section 287(g) program in the county);
Lydersen, supra note 142 (reporting that Arizona’s section 287(g) program was revoked
following a DOJ investigation finding that Maricopa County Sheriff Arpaio engaged in
pervasive racial profiling); Ruiz, supra note 142 (describing the section 287(g) program as
“synonymous with racial profiling”); see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, supra note 276, at
7 (“[I]t is now common practice for 287(g) police/jail officers and ICE agents to simply place
detainers on anyone in criminal custody who has admitted to being foreign-born . . . .”).
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Once the prosecution apparatus begins, factors like race, language, and
immigration status continue to affect the operation of the criminal
justice system for noncitizens, influencing custody determinations,
selection for immigration detainers, and quality of representation. Thus,
although race, national origin, and immigration status should be
irrelevant to criminal justice, 316 in minor cases such factors contribute to
inequities for noncitizens from arrest to conviction.
Furthermore, predicating removal on minor convictions allows
significant disparities in outcomes for similarly situated defendants both
within and across states. Indeed, the fact that some local prosecutors
and defenders will be attuned (and sympathetic) to disproportionate
immigration consequences, while others will not, creates a pattern of
immigration enforcement across jurisdictions that bears little relation to
the federal government’s expressed policy goals, or to notions of fairness
and proportional justice. 317 Instead, patterns of detention and
deportation will turn on the indigenous policies of local enforcement
agencies and prosecutors’ offices, funding realities affecting the
provision of counsel to the indigent, the institutional capacities of local
defender organizations, and the implementation of enforcement
programs that give ICE access to information about noncitizen
defendants.
While local prosecutorial policies affecting charging and
bargaining will result in disparities across jurisdictions for all levels of
offenses, the differences may be more extreme in non-federal petty
cases. First, all felony defendants will at least be entitled to counsel if
they cannot afford an attorney. 318 Unlike many misdemeanor
prosecutions, then, felonies will generally be subject to “the crucible of
meaningful adversarial testing.” 319 Second, prosecutors screen serious
offenses more thoroughly at the charging stage. They tend to take the
time to evaluate the strength of felony cases and decline felony
prosecutions at much higher rates than with misdemeanor charges.
Felonies are labor intensive, more complex, and more likely to be
contested. Felony arrests also do not tend to result from the same sort of
public order policing strategies that so frequently correlate with racial
disparities. Finally, the grand jury process provides an important
additional check on felony prosecutions.
316 See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that the government may
not afford fewer criminal protections on the basis of alienage or race).
317 Thanks to Issa Kohler-Hausmann for her contribution to this insight. For further
discussion of the proportionality implications, see infra Part IV.C.
318 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
319 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 34 (1972) (“Counsel is needed so that the accused may know precisely what he is doing,
so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly
by the prosecution.”).
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Elevated Risk of Unjustified Immigration Penalties on the Basis of
Unreliable Misdemeanor Convictions

A number of commentators have begun to propose reforms and
legal challenges to address the disproportionate consequences that
follow inclusion of minor offenses in the INA’s deportation
categories. 320 Michael Wishnie, for example, has argued that the Fifth
and Eighth Amendments constrain the imposition of the severe (and
cumulative) penalties of deportation and prohibition from lawful
reentry. 321 He suggests that noncitizens raise constitutional challenges to
the proportionality of their removal orders. 322 Others, like Juliet Stumpf
and Angela Banks, have argued for legislative changes to calibrate
immigration sanctions to the degree of the noncitizen’s underlying civil
or criminal offense. 323 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, in turn, has focused on
how improvements to ICE’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the
federal level might ameliorate disproportionate outcomes. 324
The proportionality critique underappreciates the scope of the
problem. The current deportation scheme’s unfairness lies not just in
the lopsided severity of imposing banishment on the basis of minor
convictions with little ex-post discretion to consider the noncitizens’
equities. Rather, there is insufficient guarantee that noncitizen
misdemeanants are legally or even factually guilty of the particular
offenses used to justify deportation or exclusion. The broad categories of
deportable offenses, assembly-line processing in many lower criminal
courts, blunt efforts to enforce immigration laws, and limited postconviction discretionary relief converge to generate a high likelihood of
unwarranted removals on the basis of convictions that do not reliably
indicate guilt.
Criminality has long been a basis for deportation. 325 Yet for a
hundred years, Congress’s judgment has been to require a formal
conviction rendered in a court of law, which has well-established
constitutional safeguards for criminal defendants and strict evidentiary
See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 201.
Id.
322 Id.
323 See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1732–40 (2009)
(arguing for enactment of a graduated range of immigration penalties according to the
seriousness of the underlying immigration offense); Angela M. Banks, The Normative &
Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2044801 (arguing that returning to the
foundational principle of proportionality in immigration law would require recognizing the
removal of green-card holders on the basis of minor crimes as excessive).
324 Wadhia, supra note 101, at 294–99.
325 See Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (providing for deportation on the basis of crimes involving moral
turpitude committed within five years of entry).
320
321
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requirements, all of which are designed to ensure that individual
prosecutions are meritorious and that guilt is reliably adjudicated. 326
While Congress has gradually, and sometimes dramatically, expanded
the categories of deportable convictions that sweep in minor offenses, it
has thus far eschewed the route of statutorily reducing the indicia of
criminality required to trigger deportability. The few exceptions to the
conviction requirement for deportation of lawfully present
noncitizens—human traffickers, drug abusers or addicts, terrorists—
prove the rule. 327 In these extremely limited (and rarely relied upon)
exceptions, noncitizens may be deported on an administrative finding of
criminality, with relaxed rules of evidence, and no right to counsel.328
Outside of these exceptions, then, Congress long made clear that lawful,
permanent members of our society should only lose that status on the
basis of criminal wrong-doing when we are very sure they in fact did
something wrong.
While commentators have proffered various justifications for using
criminal convictions as a basis for imposing immigration consequences,
the core of each theory is that convictions are a proxy for social
desirability. 329 But whatever the merits of that proxy in general, the

326 See, e.g., In re Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684, 687–88 (B.I.A. 2004) (holding that Congress
did not want immigration consequences triggered by convictions rendered in proceedings that
do not “provide[] the constitutional safeguards normally attendant upon a criminal
adjudication”).
327 A noncitizen is subject to the human trafficking deportability ground merely on the basis
of knowledge or “reason to believe” on the part of the consular officer, Secretary of Homeland
Security, Secretary of State, or Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(F) (2012)
(incorporating 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(H)). Similarly, a noncitizen found to engage in terrorist
activities or conduct implicating national security grounds, see id. §§ 1227(a)(4)(A)–(B), or
“who is, or at any time after admission has been, a drug abuser or addict” is deportable even in
the absence of a conviction, see id. 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii). Finally, noncitizens who were inadmissible
at time of entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) are deportable without a conviction.
328 The removal charge most relevant here, regarding drug abusers and addicts, is
exceedingly rare. Drug abuse or addiction has been a ground of deportability in various forms
since 1952. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 241(11), Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat.
163, 206 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii)) (providing for the deportation of
any alien who “is, or hereafter at anytime after entry has been, a narcotic drug addict”).
Nevertheless, research discloses only one reported decision in which the government relied on
this ground to deport a noncitizen. See McJunkin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 579
F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that deportation on grounds of drug addiction does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment). A few unpublished administrative decisions show
that ICE intermittently lodges the drug abuse ground under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) in
deportation cases, along with conviction-based grounds of removability, but the drug abuse
charge is invariably withdrawn or not sustained. See, e.g., In Re Dong Qiu, 2004 WL 1398756
(B.I.A. 2004). Finally, removal statistics published by DHS and TRAC do not indicate any use
of this ground of deportation in recent years. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra
note 24, at 1, 6 tbl. 7; Deportation Orders Sought in Immigration Court Based on Alleged
Criminal Activity by Type, TRAC IMMIGRATION, supra note 99.
329 See Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible
Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 125–30 (2012) (discussing various theories proffered by
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reliability of convictions as indicia of culpability sufficient to warrant
banishment begins to crumble when applied to misdemeanants. The
categories of deportable convictions that sweep in minor offenses can no
longer be seen as bright lines clearly delineating undesirable
noncitizens. Deportations predicated on misdemeanor convictions now
cannot be justified as based on reliable evidence of criminality, because
petty convictions now convey next to nothing about whether the
immigrant did something normatively wrong.
As this Article shows, then, deportations that follow the outcomes
of non-federal misdemeanor prosecutions erode Congress’s centurylong judgment that deportation be predicated on a criminal conviction
rather than some lesser finding of criminal conduct. Not only does the
severity of deportation outweigh the gravity of most minor convictions,
such convictions frequently result from processes “badly detached from
the core legitimating precept of individual fault.” 330 Once noncitizens
enter the criminal justice system, the odds of being funneled to
deportation proceedings through federal enforcement programs are
high. Inevitably, the government deports many noncitizens, including
those with lawful status and substantial community ties, on the basis of
minor crimes of which the individual should not have been convicted.
Even when noncitizens are able to exit the criminal justice system
without ICE apprehension, their guilty pleas may lead to immigration
consequences further down the line. LPRs with minor convictions, for
example, may be subject to inadmissibility grounds if they travel abroad,
or may become ineligible for naturalization or discretionary relief
should they later end up in removal proceedings. 331 As noted, certain
unauthorized noncitizens may be eligible to regularize their status on
the basis of strong community and family ties in this country,332
dangerous conditions they would face in their country of origin, 333 or
other grounds. 334 But misdemeanor convictions generally foreclose
these possibilities for avoiding deportation or regularizing immigration
commentators to explain or justify using contact with criminal justice systems as a proxy for
immigrant undesirability).
330 Natapoff, supra note 19, at 1319.
331 See supra Part III.B.2.
332 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (waiver of unlawful presence bars for beneficiaries of
family petitions on the grounds that inadmissibility would cause qualifying U.S. relatives
extreme hardship); id. § 1229b(b)(1) (providing for cancellation of removal for non-LPRs).
333 See, e.g., id. § 1158 (asylum); id. § 1254 (temporary protected status).
334 See, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the
Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1463–66 (2006) (describing potential visas available to
undocumented noncitizens who are victims of serious crime in this country); Consideration of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra
note 61 (setting forth DHS policy granting a two-year renewable reprieve from deportation,
along with lawful authority to work and other benefits, to undocumented immigrants under the
age of thirty who were brought to the United States when very young and who are currently in
school or have a diploma or GED).
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status. 335 The convergence of immigration enforcement with the
criminal justice system thus creates a vicious cycle, squeezing out much
of what mitigating and humanitarian concerns remain in current
immigration law as noncitizens facing untenable choices attempt to exit
the misdemeanor criminal justice system as rapidly as possible.
While Padilla’s Sixth Amendment rule on its face applies only to
deportation consequences that automatically follow guilty pleas,
proportionality concerns are also raised when petty convictions create
inadmissibility bars, or foreclose the possibility of paths to lawful status
or discretionary relief from removal that would otherwise have been
available. 336 Regardless of whether constitutional effective assistance of
counsel encompasses advice about immigration consequences beyond
deportation, 337 the severity of such sanctions can vastly exceed the
gravity of misdemeanor offenses, particularly where there are good
reasons to question the underlying conviction. At rock bottom, the
legitimacy of deporting or denying admission to a noncitizen on the
basis of criminality turns on the reliability of the evidence of that
individual’s wrong-doing. Misdemeanor convictions are increasingly
unreliable indicia of culpability and social desirability.
V. TOWARDS REFORM
My primary aim in this Article has been to show how the
deportation and misdemeanor prosecution systems interact to produce
graver injustices than observers have previously understood. Truly
meaningful reforms at the state or federal level must account for these
underappreciated consequences of current deportation policy, and the
significant impact on noncitizen misdemeanor defendants and local
justice systems. Here I will briefly evaluate a few possibilities that might
address the problems raised by the interaction between federal
immigration policies and state misdemeanor prosecutions.
See supra Part III.B.2.
See Smyth, supra note 194, at 146–50 (arguing that the harshness and intractability of
immigration law has given rise to a “practical imperative” to ensure that immigrants who enter
the state criminal justice system receive fair outcomes and equitable consideration); Wishnie,
supra note 201, at 431–35 (arguing that bars to lawful reentry based on convictions or
immigration violations raise proportionality concerns).
337 See Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1492 n.10 (2012) (“Armed with knowledge that a
guilty plea would preclude travel abroad, aliens like Vartelas might endeavor to negotiate a plea
to a nonexcludable offense—in Vartelas’ case, e.g., possession of counterfeit securities—or
exercise a right to trial.”); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322–25 (2001) (holding that noncitizens
pleading guilty have a reliance interest in expected eligibility for discretionary relief from
deportation); Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 455 (2d Cir. 1986) (suggesting that the
right to effective assistance of counsel includes assistance in seeking a discretionary judicial
recommendation against deportation).
335
336
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To be sure, reforms at the federal level could eliminate the root
causes of much of the misdemeanor crisis for noncitizens. If Congress
were to legislatively remove or reduce the immigration consequences of
minor convictions—for example by explicitly defining aggravated
felonies or crimes involving moral turpitude to exclude
misdemeanors—the most disproportional outcomes could be avoided.
Legislation along these lines would have two beneficial effects in
misdemeanor court. First, if deportation is no longer a common result
of petty offenses, less is at stake for noncitizens when the system gets it
wrong. 338 Second, legislatively defining removable offenses to exclude all
or most misdemeanor convictions would allow noncitizens, especially
lawful permanent residents, to exercise their right to fight minor
criminal charges or to litigate unconstitutional arrests without risking a
conviction that could result in mandatory detention and ultimately
deportation. 339
Congress could also restore opportunities for state or federal
adjudicators to exercise post-conviction discretion to mitigate
immigration consequences in appropriate cases. For example, as
immigration law becomes increasingly intertwined with criminal justice
systems it may make sense to give trial judges the authority to make
recommendations against deportation, especially in plea-bargain cases
where counsel is not appointed. 340 The over-inclusive dragnet created by
the convergence of immigration enforcement and criminal law also
supports an expansion of immigration judge discretionary authority, to
account for cases where the enforcement scheme results in manifest
disproportionality. 341 Additionally, Congress could clarify that all
convictions pardoned or expunged by states are no longer deportable
offenses, so that states could correct injustices in the most egregious
cases and reward those who have clearly rehabilitated. 342 While these
reforms would not remove the risk that a noncitizen might face
deportation based on a minor conviction for a crime she did not
commit, they would at least allow more opportunities for the
338 Of course, federal immigration legislation would address only one (highly significant)
collateral consequence of the misdemeanor system. The general critique of the integrity and
social consequences of misdemeanor convictions would remain. Still, removing the negative
immigration outcomes that can follow petty offenses would largely ensure that at least lawfully
present immigrants are in no worse position than misdemeanor defendants who are U.S.
citizens.
339 Cf. Roberts, supra note 261, at 10–11 (arguing that if more misdemeanor defendants
choose trial over a guilty plea, especially in targeted types of cases, the system might internalize
the true costs of exploding misdemeanor prosecutions and reform in beneficial ways).
340 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (discussing JRADs).
341 But cf. Wishnie, supra note 201, at 441–45 (arguing that immigration judges already have
authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) to conduct a proportionality review of a removal
order).
342 See generally Cade, supra note 52.
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consideration of equitable or mitigating factors. Other meaningful
possibilities for federal reform include amending the INA to provide
that deportation consequences not be imposed on the basis of
convictions where there was no right to counsel in the criminal
proceeding. The INA could also be amended to allow defendants to
enter state diversionary programs in minor cases without fear of
deportation. While immigration law tends to be particularly entrenched
and subject to political gridlock, 343 significant federal legislative reform
appears a more realistic possibility following the 2012 reelection of
President Obama. 344 Indeed, the growing state and local level reforms
discussed below may coalesce as a catalyst for legislative amendments to
the INA. On the other hand, federal immigration reforms that
significantly benefit noncitizens with criminal history remain less
likely. 345 As of the time editing for this Article concluded, none of the
legislative reforms I have suggested here appear to be under
consideration by Congress.
The executive branch could also take actions that would ameliorate
some of the corrosive effects of the ICE jail immigration enforcement
programs. While such voluntary restriction has seemed unlikely in view
of the political economy of immigration enforcement against
noncitizens encountering the criminal justice system, the Obama
Administration has demonstrated more recently that it is sometimes
willing to tolerate fewer apprehensions of deportable noncitizens where
there are high collateral costs to justice. For instance, the federal
government has terminated or modified immigration enforcement
programs where the DOJ has found evidence of local discriminatory
policing practices against immigrants. 346

343 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2012) (describing how the various dynamics producing the structure of
modern immigration law create powerful obstacles to legislative change); Wishnie, supra note
201, at 416–17.
344 See, e.g., Julia Preston, Senators Offer a New Blueprint for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2013, at A1.
345 See, e.g., Alan Gomez, White House Immigration Plan Offers Path to Residency, USA
TODAY (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/16/obamaimmigration-bill/1925017 (reporting that noncitizens would be ineligible for the Obama
Administration’s proposal for a legalization program if “convicted of a crime that led to a
prison term of at least one year, three or more different crimes that resulted in a total of 90 days
in jail, or if they committed any offense abroad that if committed in the United States would
render the alien inadmissible or removable from the United States” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
346 See, e.g., Ball, supra note 142 (reporting that following a DOJ report accusing Alamance
County, North Carolina deputies and Sheriff Terry Johnson of biased policing, ICE terminated
the section 287(g) program in the county); Lydersen, supra note 142 (reporting that Arizona’s
section 287(g) program was revoked following a DOJ investigation finding that Maricopa
County Sheriff Arpaio engaged in pervasive racial profiling); Press Release, Office of Pub.
Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Releases Investigative Findings on the Alamance
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On December 21, 2012, John Morton issued a new memorandum
purporting to bring the use of detainers in line with the priorities for
immigration enforcement previously expressed in the DHS policy
memoranda issued in 2010 and 2011. 347 The 2012 memo asks ICE
agents and officers (but not CBP agents) to refrain from issuing
detainers in criminal cases in certain circumstances. 348 It remains to be
seen, of course, whether this policy will be ignored on the ground level,
just as the prior top-down prosecutorial discretion memoranda largely
have been. 349 Even assuming good faith, the guidance offered in the new
detainer directive is vague and offers enough loopholes that its practical
effect is in some doubt. Nevertheless, if sufficient political pressure is
exerted in light of the negative consequences of ICE programs for the
integrity of criminal justice systems, DHS might determine that further,
more specific modifications of the detainer programs are warranted.
Perhaps as more jurisdictions enact policies that resist compliance with
detainers, 350 especially where issued against noncitizens not charged
with serious offenses, the federal government will continue to revise its
enforcement policies with an eye towards fostering cooperation rather
than dissonance with local jurisdictions.
At least in the short term, however, measures to address the pleabargain crisis for noncitizens in misdemeanor court are most likely to
occur at the local level (if at all), including decriminalization of some
petty offenses, more robust misdemeanor defense, and detainerresistance policies. As scrutiny of the pathologies of the misdemeanor
system—including the disproportionate collateral consequences that
follow minor convictions—continues to mount, the idea that the
institutional actors in lower courts will recalibrate becomes more
realistic. While most of the burden inevitably falls on misdemeanor
defense attorneys, top-down policies in prosecutors’ offices and more
nuanced training might address some of the problems at the
discretionary point of charging. Prosecutors could be trained to more
explicitly think about the equities and consider the proportionality of
deportation. 351 As a default posture in cases where the defendant is
unrepresented, prosecutors could have a roster of immigration-safe

Cnty., N.C., Sheriff’s Office (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/September/
12-crt-1125.html.
347 See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement,
Civil Immigration Enforcement: Guidance on the Use of Detainers in the Federal, State, Local,
and Tribal Criminal Justice Systems (Dec. 21, 2012), available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/
detention-reform/pdf/detainer-policy.pdf.
348 Id. at 2.
349 See supra Part I.B.
350 See infra text accompanying notes 364–368.
351 See Altman, supra note 118, at 34–38 (arguing that post-Padilla, prosecutors have a duty
to pursue criminal dispositions with proportional immigration outcomes).
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pleas to offer. 352 Admittedly, “immigration-safe” pleas are something of
a moving target because Congress can make immigration consequences
retroactive. 353 Additionally, deportability may depend on facts about the
defendants’ situation that are unknown to prosecutors. Still, attempting
to offer safe pleas is preferable to a system in which prosecutors
negotiate pleas with unrepresented defendants without taking the
potential immigration consequences into account.
In any event, prosecutors should more frequently decline
prosecution of cases that arise out of indiscriminate public-order
policing or where racial profiling appears likely. 354 Defense attorneys
need to push harder and more frequently for immigration-safe pleas,
which inevitably means they must be willing (and able) to take more
misdemeanor cases to trial. 355 Judges should ensure that defendants
have more information about the strength of the prosecutors’ cases
before they plea. Strengthening the defendants’ hands by increasing
their access to information (and to a tougher misdemeanor defense bar)
is likely to lead prosecutors to exercise more charging discretion, and
may ultimately influence arrest discretion. While these sorts of systemic
changes may never be implemented on a wide-scale, they are worthy of
further exploration, and with increased attention paid to lower courts
they may no longer be beyond the realm of possibility in some
jurisdictions.
Decriminalization of low-level offenses would also address many of
the problems with misdemeanor courts, and not just for noncitizens. 356
352 It is possible that trial judges may want a record of any plea offers in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s recent plea-bargain jurisprudence. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408
(2012) (requiring that defendants be informed about any potentially beneficial plea offers from
the prosecution); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390–91 (2012) (holding that defense
counsel’s incompetent advice about the merits of taking a particular plea offer establishes
prejudice); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486–87 (2010) (holding that defendants have a
constitutional right to advice about the deportation consequences of convictions). See generally
Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, supra note 121, at 22–23 (explaining judicial
incentives following Padilla, Lafler, and Frye to investigate the content of plea negotiations). It
remains to be seen whether the Court’s increased willingness to police the content of plea
negotiations will filter down to uncounseled misdemeanor proceedings.
353 See, e.g., IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 321(b), 110 Stat. 3009-627, 3009-628
(1996) (making the aggravated felony ground of removal retroactive to cover all crimes within
the definition irrespective of the date of commission).
354 ICE prosecutors should also decline to prosecute in immigration court where there is
evidence that noncitizens, especially LPRs, were apprehended through unconstitutional
policing strategies. See, e.g., Billy Ball, Marty Rosenbluth: Fighting for the Rights of
Undocumented Immigrants, INDY WEEK (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/
marty-rosenbluth-fighting-for-the-rights-of-undocumented-immigrants/Content?oid=3255480
(reporting that ICE prosecutors in North Carolina immigration court “dropped dozens of
cases” against undocumented noncitizens who had been racially profiled, most egregiously in
Alamance County).
355 See Roberts, supra note 261.
356 See Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions Remain, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P15 (reporting that the successful decriminalization in 2012 of personal
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Decriminalization (in contrast to simply reducing penalties) would
prevent minor offenses from triggering most (but not all) negative
immigration consequences. 357 As Jenny Roberts observes,
decriminalization also has the advantage of ameliorating the problem of
overloaded defender systems. 358 Civil offenses, however, can still lead to
discretionary denials of immigration relief. 359 Civil offenses might also
remain a problem for LPRs who leave the country and become subject
to inadmissibility grounds that do not require an actual conviction.
On the other hand, movements to reduce penalties for
misdemeanors (but not actual decriminalization) present a mixed bag
for noncitizens. The principle policy rationale advanced for nonincarcerative penalties for minor crimes appears to be that more of the
limited funding for provision of criminal defense could then be
allocated to felony representation. 360 Some cities and states have
implemented policy changes along these lines. 361 But reforms that do no
more than reduce penalties are of limited benefit to noncitizen
defendants because convictions can still trigger immigration
consequences. On the plus side, lesser penalties could help noncitizens
avoid certain minor convictions classified as aggravated felonies or
crimes involving moral turpitude. 362 But where such reforms result in
reduced access to counsel, noncitizens will be much less likely to
marijuana possession in Colorado and Washington, would, in the view of the ballots’
supporters, “end thousands of small-scale drug arrests while freeing law enforcement to focus
on larger crimes” and “save court systems and police departments additional millions”).
357 For decriminalization to be effective for noncitizens, the burden of proof should be less
than beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684, 687–88 (B.I.A. 2004)
(holding that convictions obtained through a preponderance of the evidence standard are not
sufficiently criminal to trigger immigration consequences). This is not to say that statutorily
reducing penalties would be of no use to noncitizens charged with petty offenses. For example,
as discussed supra Part II.B, reducing the sentences for all misdemeanors to be less than one
year would help noncitizens avoid the aggravated felony category of removal.
358 Roberts, supra note 19, at 303, 331–33.
359 A number of immigration benefits and forms of relief from removal, like naturalization,
cancellation of removal, or adjustment of status based on humanitarian grounds, such as the
Violence Against Women Act, can be denied if the noncitizen is determined to lack “good
moral character.” See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2012) (describing non-exhaustive grounds for
finding that a person does not have good moral character for the purposes of immigration and
naturalization); Clapman, supra note 20, at 616 n.175.
360 See, e.g., Hashimoto, supra note 19, at 497–99 (proposing states deal with resource issues
by amending penal statutes to require counsel only when there is a constitutional right and
then eliminating imprisonment penalties for minor offenses); see also Benjamin H. Barton &
Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 967, 985–91 (2012) (arguing for more institutional facilitation of pro se access to courts
so that limited funding can be allocated to serious criminal matters like complex felonies).
361 See, e.g., Alex Kreit, The Decriminalization Option: Should States Consider Moving from a
Criminal to a Civil Drug Court Model?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 299, 325 (listing states
considering reforms to drug policies).
362 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F)–(G) (including crimes of violence or theft within the
category of aggravated felony if the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year); id.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (requiring possibility of one-year sentence for crimes of moral turpitude).
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become aware of the removal consequences that may still follow other
minor offenses. 363
Regardless, systemic changes to the norms of the misdemeanor
system like these, while critical, will not adequately address the justiceundermining incentives created by the intimate integration of
immigration enforcement with the criminal justice process. Even with
the assistance of a competent lawyer and accurate information about
immigration consequences, the presence or threat of detainers will lead
many noncitizens to throw in the towel despite unmeritorious grounds
for a conviction. One possible measure local and state governments can
take to ensure the integrity of criminal justice for noncitizens, then, is to
enact measures to resist immigration detainers in at least some
circumstances. A handful of jurisdictions, including major urban
centers like New York City, Milwaukee, Chicago, and Baltimore, have
begun to implement such detainer-resistance policies to varying
degrees—and with varying levels of push-back from the federal
government 364 and local police. 365 California’s Governor Brown recently
vetoed a bill that would have limited compliance with immigration
detainers throughout the state, though he also noted that “federal agents
shouldn’t try to coerce local law enforcement officers into detaining
people who've been picked up for minor offenses and pose no
reasonable threat to their community.” 366 Following Governor Brown’s
veto, California Attorney General Kamala Harris issued statewide
guidance opining that detainers are not mandatory and instructing law
See generally Clapman, supra note 20, at 590–98.
ICE Director John Morton informed Cook County, Illinois, officials, for example, that
the ordinance violates federal law and threatened to block federal money owed to the county
through an entirely separate program. See Letter from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, to Toni Preckwinkle, President, Cook County Board of Commissioners
(Jan. 4, 2012), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/MortonLetter-to-Preckwinkle-01-04-2012.pdf; see also Ben Winograd, ICE Distorts Facts in Debate
over Immigration Detainers, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Mar. 1, 2012), http://immigration
impact.com/2012/03/01/ice-distorts-facts-in-debate-over-immigration-detainers
(discussing
subsequent activities).
365 See, e.g., Antonio Olivo, Feds Seek Compromise on Cook County Immigration
Ordinance, CHI. TRIB., Feb 29, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-02-29/news/ctmet-cook-county-immigration-ordinance-0229-20120229_1_illegal-immigrants-ice-detainersimmigration-enforcement-agency (describing resistance to the law by “Sheriff Tom Dart and
others [who] expressed concerns that illegal immigrants arrested for murder, assault and other
major crimes were being allowed to walk free—some going on to commit more crimes”); Larry
Sandler, Abele Switches Stand on Immigration Policy for Inmates, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
June 4, 2012, http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/abele-switches-stand-on-immigrationpolicy-for-inmates-7q5lkh3-157060355.html (reporting that in Milwaukee the sheriff vowed to
resist the resolution and continue cooperating with ICE).
366 See Elise Foley, TRUST Act Vetoed: California Gov. Jerry Brown Calls Limits on
Immigration Enforcement ‘Flawed,’ HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/10/01/trust-act-veto-jerry-brown_n_1928444.html (quoting Jerry Brown,
Governor, California).
363
364
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enforcement to use discretion when determining whether to comply
with requests. 367
While helpful to certain categories of noncitizen defendants, thus
far most of these resistance policies contain exceptions that do not
entirely eliminate the pressure they exert on noncitizens to plead guilty.
Still, as additional jurisdictions adopt detainer resistance measures, we
may see the rise of more widespread resistance to the ramped-up federal
enforcement efforts, which could encourage the federal government to
reform its current approach to immigration enforcement. It is also
possible that lawsuits challenging the legality of detainers will result in
some systemic reforms.368 Indeed, the concerns raised by local
governments and civil liberties advocates have already influenced the
federal government’s detainer policies to some degree. 369 The most
recent Morton memo on the issuance of detainers, for example, appears
to be an accommodating response to local resistance measures.370
Nevertheless, it would be naive to predict a significant reduction in the
integration of immigration enforcement with criminal justice systems in
the near future. 371
CONCLUSION
Scholars, policy makers, and courts have failed to adequately
appreciate the degree to which current immigration policies impact
noncitizens arrested for misdemeanors. As this Article has endeavored
to show, the “creative” plea bargains envisioned by Padilla are unlikely
to occur in the petty cases where they should be most successful. The
misdemeanor system, especially when coupled with aggressive
367 See Lee Romney & Cindy Chang, U.S. Program Called Optional: Attorney General Says
Secure Communities Has Swept Up Too Many Non-Criminals, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at 1.
368 See, e.g., Thomas MacMillan, “Secure Communities” Suffers a Setback, NEW HAVEN
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/
entry/activists_announce_a_victory_against_secure_communities (reporting that in settlement
to resolve a lawsuit brought by a clinic at Yale Law School, the Connecticut Department of
Corrections agreed to review immigration detainer requests on a case-by-case basis, a policy
that shortly “resulted in a 70 percent drop in the number of Connecticut residents turned over
to ICE”). See generally Legal Action Center, Challenging the Use of ICE Immigration Detainers,
AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, http://www.legalactioncenter.org/clearinghouse/litigation-issuepages/enforcement-detainers (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (summarizing litigation in various
states).
369 See generally ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 68, at 38–40 (discussing changes
announced by ICE to respond to concerns raised about the section 287(g) and Secure
Communities programs).
370 See supra text accompanying notes 349–352.
371 See Cuéllar, supra note 343, at 32–33, 41–47, 52–78 (arguing that immigration
enforcement provisions tend to be particularly susceptible to entrenchment); McLeod, supra
note 329, at 154–55, 173–74 (arguing that undoing the entrenched criminal-immigration
convergence would necessitate a complete conceptual reorientation of immigration law).
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immigration enforcement, generates convictions not reliably predicated
on fault. The overlap of the systems corrodes the integrity of each.
Meaningful reforms by state or federal actors—and perhaps at both
levels—must account for these underappreciated consequences of
current deportation policy.

